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ABSTRACT
Partisan gerrymandering has been and will continue to be a topic of interest
in the coming years. States will soon begin their redistricting process following the
2020 Census. We introduce a method of simulating Congressional elections which
provides a new way of examining and visualizing the votes-to-seats relationship
for a state Congressional map using past election data. We are able to build upon
Mira Bernstein’s method of uniformly simulating elections by injecting a data-
driven component of variation into the simulations. Additionally, we are able to
directly evaluate the accuracy of our simulations using a type of cross-validation.
We compare our results from a handful of notable states to other measures of
partisan gerrymandering, such as the efficiency gap, and do so in light of recent
court cases and other important contexts.
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1. Introduction
The United States Constitution requires that federal elections be held every
two years to elect members to the U.S. House of Representatives. Each of the
435 voting members of the House is elected by voters from predefined, distinct
Congressional districts. Each district elects only a single representative, making
the elections winner-take-all. This means, for example, that a district with 60% of
the vote going to the Republican candidate would yield the same number of seats,
1, as a district where the Republican won 90% of the vote. Every state is allocated
a specific number of districts according to their population as enumerated by the
United States Census which is conducted every 10 years. State governments are
given the power to draw their own district boundaries with the following conditions
required by federal law:
1. Districts must have roughly equal populations as recorded by the latest
census.
2. The Congressional map must conform to standards defined by the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.
Several states have additional conditions, such as compactness or contiguity,
which they require of their own maps. These conditions will not be the focus
here, however. Instead, we will focus primarily on the partisan fairness of state
Congressional maps. There are many different ways one could define fairness
in this context, many of which revolve around the relationship between votes and
seats. Should a map be considered fair if this relationship is proportional? If party
A wins X% of the vote, should it be expected to win X% of the seats? Evidence
suggests this expectation is likely unreasonable. Tufte (1973) noted that a lack
of proportionality occurs quite often, and naturally, in winner-take-all elections.
More specifically, a party who wins a majority of the vote will usually win an even
larger majority of seats. We refer to this phenomenon as a “winner’s bonus.”
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Definition 1.1 (Winner’s Bonus). The “extra” proportion of seats won by a party
who won a majority of the statewide vote. We can compute this explicitly as
Winner’s Bonus = Seats Won (%)− Votes (%). (1.1)
Since the states are in charge of drawing their own Congressional maps, they
each have their own protocol for doing so. Most have their maps drawn and voted
upon by partisan bodies (Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and Congressional
Redistricting , 2018), meaning a controlling party can draw maps which afford them
a higher winner’s bonus. The difficulty lies in determining when this process goes
too far and produces an unfair map, that is, determining when gerrymandering
has taken place.
Definition 1.2 (Gerrymandering). The process of dividing a geographical area into
political districts with the intent of providing a political advantage to a certain
group or party.
There are two main types of gerrymandering often focused upon in the
United States. Racial gerrymandering is the drawing of districts with the intent
to diminish the voting power of one or more racial minorities. The aforemen-
tioned Voting Rights Act of 1965 exists, in part, as an effort to curb this kind
of gerrymandering. We will focus on the other type, partisan gerrymandering,
which is the drawing of districts with the intent to benefit one political party.
In the United States Supreme Court case, Davis v. Bandemer (1986), Indiana
Democrats argued that the state’s legislature was unfairly apportioned to weaken
the voting power of Democratic voters. While the Court ultimately disagreed with
the plaintiffs, they did maintain that partisan gerrymandering is justiciable under
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. In later cases, the court has held that some political gerrymandering is
acceptable and, as Justice Scalia wrote in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), the difficulty
is “determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far.”
2
The court has established that any test for partisan gerrymandering should
be able to show both intent and effects. That is, it must be demonstrated that
a Congressional map was drawn with the intent to favor one political party over
another and that the Congressional map creates an unfair distribution of voting
power for a party not in control of redistricting. One of the reasons the intent
component is important is the existence of natural gerrymandering. Due largely
to patterns in human geography, certain parties can be placed at an inherent
disadvantage. This phenomenon was examined thoroughly by Chen, Rodden, et
al. (2013).
The Court holds that partisan gerrymandering can be identified by a partisan
asymmetry. In other words, if the statewide vote were flipped to favor the other
party instead, the map would be considered asymmetric if the other party were
not expected to win the same number of seats as the first party did. For example,
if Republicans win an average of 70% of seats in a state’s Congressional election
with 60% of the vote, Democrats should be expected to win an average of 70% of
the seats if they, instead, had received 60% of the vote. If this were not the case,
the map would be considered asymmetric.
Initially our hope was to derive a statistical test for partisan asymmetry of
a Congressional map. Such a test would have examined the relationship between
statewide vote and seats won for both major parties, returning a p-value which
could be used to determine if there was a significant difference between the num-
bers of seats won for the two parties given any given statewide vote. Due to the
limited number of elections which take place under each Congressional map, this
ultimately proved too difficult a task.
Instead, we chose to re-focus our efforts on a new way of simulating statewide
Congressional elections using historical election data. We use the simulations to
examine and visualize the relationship between statewide vote and seats won, the
same relationship we were interested in statistically testing. We use a type of cross-
validation to evaluate the accuracy of the simulations. Finally, we compare our
3
results from a handful of notable states to other measures of partisan asymmetry,
such as the efficiency gap, and do so in light of recent court cases and other
important contexts.
4
2. Existing Methods
2.1. Efficiency Gap
The efficiency gap, first proposed in an article by researchers Nicholas Stephanopou-
los and Eric McGhee (2015), is centered around the idea of wasted votes, that is,
which party wastes more votes in an effort to elect their candidates in a certain
state. A vote is considered wasted if it is cast for a losing candidate, or if it is cast
for a winning candidate who would have won without it. The efficiency gap with
respect to party A is the advantage in wasted seats as a percentage of statewide
vote. Let TA and SA be the percentage of votes and seats respectively won by
party A. If we assume that the districts have the same population size, a condi-
tion already required by the Constitution, and that there are only two parties, the
simplified version of the formula with respect to party A is
Efficiency Gap = (SA − 50%)− 2(TA − 50%). (2.1)
Positive values would indicate an electoral advantage for party A while negative
values would suggest a disadvantage.
Example 2.1. Consider the hypothetical scenario shown in Table 2.1. The Repub-
licans won five out of 10, or 50% of the seats and 476 out of 1000, or 47.6% of
the votes, meaning the efficiency gap for this election is (50%− 50%)− 2(47.6%−
50%) = 4.8%
Example 2.2. Now consider the slightly altered hypothetical scenario shown in Ta-
ble 2.2. Note that the only difference from the previous example is that Democrats
won the 5th district 51-49 instead of a Republican victory by the same margin.
Here, the Republicans won 40% of the seats and 47.4% of the vote. Thus, the
efficiency gap will be (40%− 50%)− 2(47.4%− 50%) = −4.8%
These examples illustrate how susceptible the efficiency gap, like any other
measure, can be to variation. A 2% shift in a single district produced a 9.6%
5
Table 2.1: Efficiency Gap Scenario
Republican Votes Democratic Votes Total Votes
1st District 75 25 100
2nd District 75 25 100
3rd District 70 30 100
4th District 55 45 100
5th District 51 49 100
6th District 45 55 100
7th District 35 65 100
8th District 25 75 100
9th District 25 75 100
10th District 20 80 100
Total 476 524 1000
Table 2.2: Modified Efficiency Gap Scenario
Republican Votes Democratic Votes Total Votes
1st District 75 25 100
2nd District 75 25 100
3rd District 70 30 100
4th District 55 45 100
5th District 49 51 100
6th District 45 55 100
7th District 35 65 100
8th District 25 75 100
9th District 25 75 100
10th District 20 80 100
Total 474 526 1000
difference in the efficiency gap. As mentioned earlier, the court has held that
some partisan gerrymandering is acceptable and the main difficulty is determining
how much is too much. With respect to the efficiency gap, the authors suggest
thresholds of ±2 Congressional seats be used for identifying states whose maps
deviate from the norm, roughly corresponding to ±1.5 standard deviations.
2.2. Three Tests
In Samuel Wang’s (2016) Stanford Law Review article, he proposes three
additional tests for measuring partisan gerrymandering. We will not be employ-
ing any of these tests in our work; however, they are worth mentioning for their
statistical nature. A key component of the article was to establish what Wang
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referred to as a “zone of chance,” or an arbitrarily wide interval of possible out-
comes which could have occurred due to random variation alone. He established
a zone of chance for the number of seats won given a statewide vote by simulating
delegations. For any given state with N districts, Wang simulated delegations
by randomly selecting N results from the 435 nationwide Congressional elections
which added to the same vote totals (within 0.5%). The way in which these sim-
ulations were conducted would indicate data which are reflective of nationwide
district characteristics rather than the districts within the state of interest. All
three of the tests Wang proposed, which are described below, are statistical in
nature in that they take random variation into account.
1. Excess seats test: As the name would suggest, this test focuses on the pro-
portion of seats won by a party in excess of the statewide proportion vote for
that party or, in essence, the winner’s bonus for that party. The test statistic
in this case is calculated by taking the winner’s bonus and dividing it by the
estimate of the standard deviation extracted from the aforementioned simu-
lations. In context, this test statistic would represent a standardized measure
of departure from the nationwide vote-to-seat relationship. As Wang men-
tions, one disadvantage of this test is that it is not self-contained; i.e., it
requires nationwide election data for all 435 districts to test a single state.
2. Lopsided outcomes test: This is by far the simplest of the three tests. It
involves using a grouped t-test to compare the share of Democratic votes
in Democratic districts to the share of Republican votes in Republican dis-
tricts. Higher shares of votes in districts won by a party would be an in-
dication of “packing” voters of that party together, thus weakening their
electoral power. One obvious advantage of this test is its simplicity: it is
self-contained, requires no simulations, and uses only elementary statistical
techniques. One disadvantage Wang describes is that it does a poor job of
detecting bipartisan gerrymandering, which is redistricting with the intent
to protect incumbents for both parties.
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3. Reliable wins test: The third and final proposed test considers the number of
reliable wins, or protection, for the party in charge of redistricting. This test
is performed one of two different ways, depending on how competitive the
state is. If the state is closely divided, then a statistical test is performed to
determine if the mean vote across districts is higher than the median district
vote. If the state is dominated by the party in charge of redistricting, then a
statistical test is performed to see if the variances are different between the
winning vote shares of that party at the state and national levels.
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3. Congressional Election Data
3.1. Source and Import Process
Historical Congressional Election data from the years 2004 through 2016
were acquired from the Federal Elections Commission website. The data for these
years were available for download in .xls or .xslx format. The downloaded data
files were opened in Microsoft Excel and saved as .csv files.
The data were then imported using two R scripts, the first of which took the
data and combined them into a single raw data set with the objective of matching
our desired row structure. Our smallest units of interest are district-level general
election results by party, and the FEC data files were structured so that there was
a single row of data for each candidate in every Congressional primary and general
election. Our first script modified the FEC data structure to yield that desired
structure in the raw data set. The second R script modified our raw data set to
produce an analysis data set with the desired column structure for our ensuing
simulation and analysis. This primarily involved the creation and modification of
variables of interest. Both of the R scripts are included in the Appendix.
3.2. Exclusion Criteria
In the context of gerrymandering, it does not make sense to examine states
with an at-large, or single, Congressional district since there would be no Con-
gressional map to draw in those cases. Instead we will focus only on those states
with 2 or more districts. Additionally, due to the unusual nature of Louisiana’s
election system, it will be excluded from our analysis. This leaves 42 states to be
examined.
We are primarily interested in the votes-to-seats relationship for the two
major political parties in the U.S., Republicans and Democrats. Thus, we will
only examine elections where the third-party vote is less than 5%. In order to
correct for the presence of some third-party vote in our data, the Republican and
Democratic vote percentages are adjusted by calculating each as
9
Republican Vote (%) = 100× Republican Votes
Republican Votes + Democratic Votes
and (3.1)
Democratic Vote (%) = 100× Democratic Votes
Republican Votes + Democratic Votes
. (3.2)
3.3. Percentiles of Discrete Data
There are several algorithms which can be used to compute the percentiles of
data. There are nine algorithms which can be used with the quantile command in
R. These algorithms were discussed and evaluated by Hyndman and Fan (1996).
By default, the command uses the seventh definition discussed which involves the
linear interpolation of the modes of order statistics. We will use this type for any
percentile calculations. Since some of our data, such as the number of districts
won, is discrete, we will round the percentiles whenever applicable to mirror the
discrete structure of our data.
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4. Simulations
4.1. Main Objective
In order to assess the asymmetry of a Congressional map, it is helpful to
examine the relationship between votes and seats. The efficiency gap provides
a measure of this relationship, but we can also visualize it directly by plotting
the elections with votes on the horizontal axis and seats on the vertical axis.
Consider the outcome of Kentucky’s 2014 Congressional elections, shown in Table
4.1. Republicans won 64% of the vote and 5/6 = 83.3% of the seats. This election
would get plotted as the point (64, 83.3). The difficulty with this approach is the
small number of data points we would be able to plot. With new Congressional
maps being drawn every 10 years at most and elections being held every two years,
a single Congressional map will yield at most 5 points on the plot. Having so few
data points makes it difficult to extract any meaningful information regarding the
votes-to-seats relationship. One way of compensating is to fill in the gaps using
simulations.
Table 4.1: Result of Kentucky’s 2014 Congressional Elections. Source: Fed-
eral Election Commission. (n.d.). Election Results. Retrieved from https://
transition.fec.gov/pubrec/electionresults.shtml
Republican Vote Democratic Vote Winning Party
1st District 73.1% 26.9% Republican
2nd District 69.2% 30.8% Republican
3rd District 35.6% 63.5% Democratic
4th District 67.7% 32.3% Republican
5th District 78.3% 21.7% Republican
6th District 60.0% 40.0% Republican
Total 64.0% 35.9%
There are many ways one could simulate the data. One simple way, in-
troduced by Mira Bernstein (2017), would be to uniformly shift the individual
district totals from a given year, which we will refer to as our “seed election,”
incrementally by a fixed value and observe how this impacts the number of seats
11
won. By connecting these simulated points, we have a step function modeling
the votes-to-seats relationship for that map. Figure 4.1 shows the results of this
method using Kentucky’s 2014 Congressional election results.
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Figure 4.1: Bernstein Shift of Congressional Elections in Kentucky. Constructed
using 2014 as a seed value with an increment of 1.
Any part of the line which crosses through the upper left or lower right
quadrant of this plot represents an undesirable result since that would indicate
that a party wins a majority of the vote without winning the majority of the seats.
This plot, however, is generated from a single election and is therefore subject to
variation. Our objective is to simulate the data points in a way which accounts
for the random variation in elections.
4.2. Simulation Process
4.2.1. Shifts and Residuals
We are simulating shifts in statewide vote for a party from some seed value.
In order to better account for the variation at play, we want to be able to effectively
simulate the noise in how individual districts react about said shift. We can
examine this noise by looking at the “residual,” or leftover shifts in district vote
from previous elections in our data. In so doing, we standardize for the year-to-
12
year shifts in our data and isolate the noise. For a Congressional district X in
state S which voted xi percent for party A in the i
th election and whose state
voted si percent for party A overall in the same election, we calculate the residual
shift as
Residual Shift = District Shift− State Shift = (xi − xi−1)− (si − si−1). (4.1)
Since we are looking at shifts between two consecutive elections, we only
calculate the value for shifts where both years shared the same Congressional
map. Additionally, both years must also not satisfy any of our exclusion criteria.
Consider the results for Kentucky’s 2012 and 2014 Congressional elections, shown
in Table 4.2. Each of the residual shifts was calculated by taking the district shift
and subtracting 3.1%, the statewide shift.
Table 4.2: Shifts Between Kentucky’s 2012 and 2014 Congressional Elections.
Source: Federal Election Commission. (n.d.). Election Results. Retrieved from
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/electionresults.shtml
Republican Vote District Shift Residual Shift
2012 2014
1st District 69.6% 73.1% 3.5% 0.4 %
2nd District 67.0% 69.2% 2.2% -0.9%
3rd District 35.1% 35.9% 0.8% -2.3%
4th District 64.0% 67.7% 3.7% 0.6 %
5th District 77.9% 78.3% 0.4% -2.7%
6th District 52.0% 60.0% 8.0% 4.9 %
Total 60.9 64.0% Statewide Shift: 3.1%
We can now begin to examine the distribution of our residuals. The his-
togram and normal probability plot, shown in Figure 4.2, seem to present a de-
cent case for normality of our nationwide residuals, but we will still avoid making
any assumptions regarding the underlying distribution. Instead, we can simulate
district-level shifts by sampling with replacement from the distribution of residu-
als. Our simulation process will rely on the assumption that the residual variables
are homoskedastic across election years. The boxplots of our residual values by
13
year (Figure 4.3) suggest this assumption is reasonable. Unfortunately, there does
not appear to be homoskedacity across the states, though, as evident in Figure
4.4.
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Figure 4.2: Histogram and Normal Probability Plot of Residual Shifts. Normal
probability plot compares the theorical percentiles of the normal distribution with
the percentiles of our standardized residuals, providing another means of assessing
normality.
Our assumption allows us to sample from residuals across all election years.
Due to the lack of homoskedacity across states, however, we will restrict our
residual distribution to only our state of interest. Unless otherwise noted, residuals
will be sampled only from that state.
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Figure 4.3: Boxplots of Residual Republican Shift by Year.
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Figure 4.4: Boxplots of Residual Republican Shift by State.
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4.2.2. Performing and Visualizing the Simulation
Let s1, s2, ..., sk be the district-level vote percentages for party A in a state
with k districts for some election year; these will be our seed values. Suppose we
want to simulate future district level elections, t1, t2, ..., tk, where a statewide shift
of p% in statewide party A vote has taken place. Let r1, r2, ..., rk be a random
sample, with replacement, from the residual distribution. Let r¯ be the mean of
the sampled residuals. Then we simulate our districts as
t1 = s1 + p + r1 − r¯
t2 = s2 + p + r2 − r¯
...
tk = sk + p + rk − r¯.
(4.2)
Each simulated district result is calculated by taking the seed result for the dis-
trict, adding the arbitrarily selected statewide shift, adding the randomly selected
residual for the district, and subtracting the mean of the sampled residuals to
ensure the simulated statewide shift is equal to our selected statewide shift.
Example 4.1. Suppose we want to simulate a future election in Kentucky using the
2014 Congressional elections as seed values. If we want to simulate a statewide shift
of −10% in statewide Republican vote, we begin by taking a random sample with
replacement of 6 residuals, one for each of Kentucky’s 6 Congressional districts,
from the state’s distribution of residuals. Using R, we get the sample 5.9, 0.3, 2.2,
−9.8, 4.0, −7.7. The sampled residuals have a mean of −0.85. Table 4.3 provides
the results of this simulation.
Note that the simulated result column is computed by taking the sum of the
2nd, 3rd, and 4th columns and subtracting the 5th column. Under this simulation,
Republicans won 54% of the vote and 4/6 = 66.7% of the seats. We would repeat
this process programatically many times and observe the frequencies of the number
of seats won. We can do this for any statewide shift within reason to produce a
16
Table 4.3: Results of Simulation. Source: Federal Election Commission.
(n.d.). Election Results. Retrieved from https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/
electionresults.shtml
Republican Shift Residual Mean Simulated
Vote Residual Result
1st District 67.7% −10% 5.9% −0.85% 64.5%
2nd District 78.3% −10% 0.3% −0.85% 69.5%
3rd District 60% −10% 2.2% −0.85% 53.1%
4th District 69.2% −10% −9.8% −0.85% 50.3%
5th District 35.6% −10% 4% −0.85% 30.5%
6th District 73.1% −10% −7.7% −0.85% 56.3%
Statewide 64.0% 54%
large data set of simulated frequencies. Using R, we simulated 2000 such elections
where a −10% shift has taken place. Of those 2000 simulations, Republicans won
3 seats 20 times for 1%, 4 seats 1,155 times for 57.75%, and 5 seats 825 times for
41.25%. We can plot these results on a votes-seats scatter plot with the relative
frequency being represented by the transparency of the point as it is shown in
Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Partial Scatter Plot of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in Kentucky.
Simulation of elections in Kentucky with a statewide Republican vote of 54 percent
using 2014 as a seed.
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We can perform the same simulations for a range of statewide shifts, each a
certain distance apart, to help assess the overall relationship between votes and
seats in a state of interest. Still using Kentucky’s 2014 Congressional elections as
our seed values, we performed 2000 simulations for every statewide mean between
35 and 78, incrementing by 1. These means were chosen by taking the means
which would produce impossible results (district level percentages less than 0% or
greater than 100%) fewer than 5% of the time. When sampling the residuals for
a certain district, the distribution was truncated to avoid impossible results. We
then plotted all the simulation results similarly to how we did so above to produce
Figure 4.6. In this plot, the color of the point indicates which party received a
higher percentage of seats than its statewide vote percentage, and the seed value
is denoted by a larger point on the plot.
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Figure 4.6: Scatter Plot of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in Kentucky. Simulation
of elections in Kentucky using 2014 as a seed.
In addition to producing a scatter plot, there are a variety of other charts
we can also use to visualize the results of a simulation. In Figure 4.7, we plot the
2.5th, 25th, 75th, and 97.5th percentiles as well as the mean number of districts
won for the range of statewide means in our example. We do so by constructing
18
a step function for each based on the simulated frequencies. The solid black line
represents the mean number of districts won, the dashed yellow lines represent
the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, and the shaded yellow region represents the
interquartile range (IQR).
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Figure 4.7: Step Chart of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in Kentucky. Simulation
of elections in Kentucky using 2014 as a seed.
One of the main goals for our simulation is to be able to examine the level
of partisan asymmetry present in a Congressional map. In any map which is
perfectly symmetrical, we would expect both parties to convert votes-to-seats at
the same rate. That is, if Republicans are expected to win 75% of seats with 70%
of the vote, Democrats should also be expected to win 75% of the seats if they
win 70% if the vote. We can visually compare this votes-to-seats relationship for
each party using variations of the two previous plots. Figure 4.8 is constructed
similarly to Figure 4.6 with the main difference being that the color now indicates
which party the statewide vote and districts won is calculated with respect to. For
example, if Republicans won 40% of the vote and 1 seat in Kentucky, this would
be plotted as Democrats winning 60% of the vote and 5 seats.
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Figure 4.8: Scatter Plot of Statewide Vote and Seats Won by Party in Kentucky.
Simulation of elections in Kentucky using 2014 as a seed.
Figure 4.9 also provides a means of comparing the votes-to-seats relationships
of the two parties. In this variation of Figure 4.7, we look only at the 2.5th
and 97.5th percentiles in addition to the mean. The color indicates which party
the statewide vote and districts won is calculated with respect to. The shading
indicates the area between the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.
A simple way of using our simulation process to examine the fairness of a
Congressional map is to look at the behavior for a statewide vote of 50%. If
no asymmetry were present, then each party would be expected to win half of
the state’s seats when they received 50% of the vote. Moreover, we would also
expect the mean efficiency gap to be zero percent in the same situation. Our last
plot, Figure 4.10, visualizes this information, tabulating the relative frequencies
of districts won, the respective efficiency gaps, and displaying the mean efficiency
gap in the corner. The values and mean efficiency gap are calculated with respect
to the Republican party. The color indicates which party, if any, has an electoral
advantage for each value.
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Figure 4.9: Step Chart of Statewide Vote and Seats Won by Party in Kentucky.
Simulation of elections in Kentucky using 2014 as a seed.
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Figure 4.10: Bar Chart of Districts Won and Efficiency Gap in Kentucky. Simu-
lation of elections with 50 percent vote in Kentucky using 2014 as a seed.
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4.2.3. Seed Values
This process relies on having a complete set of seed values. If any district
satisfies the exclusion criteria for a given year, that year cannot be used as a seed
value. One option could be to select a different year for the Congressional map of
interest to use for a seed value but it could be that there is not a complete year,
especially for larger states. We can instead use the data across several years to help
us complete our seeds. Suppose we are interested in simulating a state’s elections
for a Congressional map which was active for the years y1, y2, ..., yn. Let sij be
the ith district vote percentage for party A in the ythj election year. It would not
suffice to simply take the means, si•, as our seed values since that would introduce
confounding from the year-to-year shifts we are trying to control for. Instead let
pj =
1
k
k∑
i=1
(sij − si1) (4.3)
and form s′ij = sij − pj. The pj values are the mean district shifts from the first
year of interest, and we subtract these from the sij values. We can then calculate
our seed values as si = s
′
i•. This does not do a perfect job of standardizing for
the year-to-year shifts, but it does provide us with the means to compute a seed
value for which we otherwise would not have had one. Unfortunately, there are
still some states for which a seed value cannot be completed. Due to California’s
top-two primary format, there has not been a Republican running in the 40th or
44th district general election for its current Congressional map.
4.2.4. Effect of Using Nationwide Residuals
As mentioned earlier, we could not justify an assumption of homoskedacity
across states for our residual distribution. We more closely examined the effect
of using statewide versus nationwide residuals by running simulations for every
possible statewide election and observing the percentage of steps where the means
were not equal. We will refer to this value as the “percent mean disagreement.”
If we look at the relationship between variance of the statewide residuals and
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percent mean disagreement, it appears the elections with higher variance may
be less accurately represented by the nationwide residuals than the ones with
lower variation. This is evident in Figure 4.11. Additionally, a plot comparing
simulations of a Congressional election in Nebraska using 2006, the election with
the highest variation in residuals, as a seed is shown in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.11: Plot of Residual Variance Versus Percent Mean Disagreement.
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Figure 4.12: Step Chart of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in Nebraska. Simula-
tions of Elections in Nebraska Using 2006 as the Seed. Shading represents values
between 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.
4.2.5. Accuracy of Simulation Process
In order to assess how accurate our simulation process is, we employed a
type of cross-validation to test our simulation process against the actual statewide
results in our data. We did so by taking each complete statewide election and
simulating an election with the same statewide vote total using the other elections
from the same Congressional map to derive our seed values and sampling from
residuals which are not affected by the test election. For each of these test elections,
we record whether or not the actual result is between the 25th and 75th percentiles
of the simulations and whether it is between the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. In
a perfectly accurate simulation, we would expect the actual results to be in these
ranges at least 50% and 95% of the time, respectively. Using R, we were able to
calculate these values for 73 statewide elections. In the other cases, either the
election satisfied the exclusion criteria, a completed seed could not be formed,
or there were no residuals available from which to sample. The values, 72.6%
and 93.2% respectively, suggest that our simulation may simulate slightly fewer
24
extreme outcomes than what is realistic but beyond that, the numbers are not
especially problematic.
Table 4.4 shows the cross-validation results for all state Congressional elec-
tions whose outcome occurred fewer than 40% of the time in the respective sim-
ulations. The Districts Won column lists the actual result for each election and
the Percentage column indicates how often the outcome occurred in the simula-
tions. The Inner 50% column indicates whether or not the outcome was between
the 25th and 75th percentiles in the simulation, and the Inner 95% column sim-
ilarly notes whether it was between the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. Of the five
elections outside the inner 95% of simulated outcomes, four were in states with
fewer than five Congressional seats. This suggests that the simulation process is
possibly less accurate for smaller states, most likely due to the small number of
residuals which are available for those states. The entire table of cross-validation
outcomes is included in the Appendix A.
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Table 4.4: Cross-Validation Results for Least Likely Outcomes. Districts won
column contains actual results for each election. Inner 50% and Inner 95% col-
umn denote whether or not the actual result was between the 25th/75th and
2.5th/97.5th percentiles, respectively.
State Year Districts Won Percentage Inner 50% Inner 95%
Maryland 2008 1 (12.5%) 0% No No
Nebraska 2006 3 (100%) 0% No No
New Hampshire 2014 1 (50%) 0% No No
Kansas 2010 4 (100%) 1.05% No No
New Mexico 2010 1 (33.3%) 1.6% No No
North Carolina 2004 7 (53.8%) 2.95% No Yes
Kentucky 2010 4 (66.7%) 3.6% No Yes
New Hampshire 2012 0 (0%) 5.85% No Yes
Iowa 2010 2 (40%) 7% No Yes
Mississippi 2010 3 (75%) 10.4% No Yes
Colorado 2004 4 (57.1%) 10.5% No Yes
Indiana 2004 7 (77.8%) 12.3% No Yes
Virginia 2012 8 (72.7%) 13.4% No Yes
Ohio 2006 11 (61.1%) 15.95% No Yes
Connecticut 2004 3 (60%) 18.7% No Yes
Wisconsin 2010 5 (62.5%) 18.9% No Yes
North Carolina 2010 6 (46.2%) 19% No Yes
Mississippi 2008 1 (25%) 20.7% No Yes
New Mexico 2006 2 (66.7%) 21% No Yes
West Virginia 2010 2 (66.7%) 22.95% No Yes
Washington 2006 3 (33.3%) 26.25% Yes Yes
Iowa 2004 4 (80%) 30.25% Yes Yes
Kansas 2006 2 (50%) 38.65% Yes Yes
4.3. Simulation of Certain States
In this section, we use our simulation process to examine six state Congres-
sional maps of interest. For each state, we provide some brief context behind each
and discuss the results of the simulation. There are four plots included with each,
one being a plot of a Bernstein-style shift using the same seed as our simulation
for comparison.
4.3.1. Pennsylvania
In Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), three Pennsylvania citizens argued that the
state’s Congressional map, drawn after the 2000 census, was gerrymandered to fa-
vor Republicans. This, they argued, violated the one-person one-vote requirement
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in the Constitution. A plurality of the court upheld the lower court ruling that
partisan gerrymandering claims were unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy, while
agreeing with the judgment that claims of partisan gerrymandering were not jus-
ticiable, stated that judicially manageable standards could be developed and used
in future cases brought before the court.
In the 2002 Congressional elections, Republicans won 58.4% of the statewide
vote and 12 out of 19, or 63.2% of the seats. This does not appear to be an overly
disproportionate result. In 2004, however, Republicans won 49.8% of the vote and
the same number of seats as they had won in the previous election. This represents
a far more asymmetrical result.
Figures 4.13 through 4.16 show the simulation results for Pennsylvania’s
2002-2010 Congressional map. The map appears to give an advantage to Repub-
licans who, as figure 4.15 suggests, are able to more effectively convert votes-to-
seats. Of the simulated elections with a statewide total of 50% (Figure 4.16),
Republicans won 10 or more of the 19 seats over 95% of the time. This results in
a mean efficiency gap of 9.27%.
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Figure 4.13: Scatter Plot of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in Pennsylvania. Sim-
ulations of elections in Pennsylvania using years 2004-2010 as the seed. n = 2000
per step.
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Figure 4.14: Bernstein-Style Simulations of Elections in Pennsylvania. Using years
2004-2010 as the seed and an increment of 1.
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Figure 4.15: Step Chart of Statewide Vote and Seats Won by Party in Pennsyl-
vania. Simulations of elections in Pennsylvania using years 2004-2010 as the seed.
Shading represents values between 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. n = 2000 per
step.
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Figure 4.16: Bar Chart of Districts Won and Efficiency Gap in Pennsylvania.
Simulations of elections with 50 percent vote in Pennsylvania using years 2004-
2010 as the seed. Line segment indicates half of total districts. n = 2000.
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4.3.2. Wisconsin
Wisconsin’s State legislature map was the subject of Gill v. Whitford (2018),
a Supreme Court case in which the plaintiffs argued their votes were wasted be-
cause of the map. It was the first case brought before the court which suggested
use of the efficiency gap would meet Justice Kennedy’s criteria for a judicially man-
ageable standard laid out in Vieth v. Jubelirer . The court ultimately remanded
the case back to lower courts, stating that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate
standing.
The Redistricting Majority Project (REDMAP) was involved in the process
of drawing the map in 2011 with the goal of ensuring Republican majorities in the
U.S. House and State legislature. In the 2012 elections, Republicans won 48.6% of
the statewide vote but 60.6% of the seats in the State Assembly. A similar lack of
asymmetry was observed in the U.S. Congressional elections where Republicans
won 48.9% of the statewide vote and five out eight, or 62.5% of the seats.
Figures 4.17 through 4.20 seem to suggest a Republican advantage for Wis-
consin’s current Congressional map. In over 85% of the simulated elections for a
statewide vote of 50% (Figure 4.20), Republicans won five seats, which is more
than half of the state’s eight seats. Conversely, Democrats won five seats less than
one percent of the time. For the 2000 simulations with a statewide vote of 50%,
the mean efficiency gap was 10.69% in favor of Republicans.
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Figure 4.17: Scatter Plot of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in Wisconsin. Simu-
lations of elections in Wisconsin using years 2012-2016 as the seed. n = 2000 per
step.
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Figure 4.18: Bernstein-Style Simulations of Elections in Wisconsin. Using years
2012-2016 as the seed and an increment of 1.
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Figure 4.19: Step Chart of Statewide Vote and Seats Won by Party in Wisconsin.
Simulations of elections in Wisconsin using years 2012-2016 as the seed. Shading
represents values between 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. n = 2000 per step.
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Figure 4.20: Bar Chart of Districts Won and Efficiency Gap in Wisconsin. Sim-
ulations of elections with 50 percent vote in Wisconsin using years 2012-2016 as
the seed. Line segment indicates half of total districts. n = 2000.
32
4.3.3. Maryland
In November of 2018, a district court ruling in the case Benisek v. Lamone
called for the mandatory redrawing of Maryland’s Congressional map prior to the
2020 elections. Unlike the previous states, Maryland’s Congressional map appears
to favor Democrats rather than Republicans. In the 2016 Congressional elections,
Republicans won 35.5% of the statewide vote but only one of the state’s eight
districts for 12.5% of the seats.
It appears that Democrats have an advantage in Maryland’s current Con-
gressional map. The simulation results are shown in figures 4.21 through 4.24. Of
the simulated elections with a statewide vote of 50% (Figure 4.24), Democrats won
more than half of the state’s eight districts over 80% of the time while Republicans
won more than half less than 2% of the time. The resulting mean efficiency gap
was −14.65%, favoring Democrats.
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Figure 4.21: Scatter Plot of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in Maryland. Simu-
lations of elections in Maryland using years 2012-2016 as the seed. n = 2000 per
step.
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Figure 4.22: Bernstein-Style Simulations of Elections in Maryland. Using years
2012-2016 as the seed and an increment of 1.
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Figure 4.23: Step Chart of Statewide Vote and Seats Won by Party in Maryland.
Simulations of elections in Maryland using years 2012-2016 as the seed. Shading
represents values between 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. n = 2000 per step.
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Figure 4.24: Bar Chart of Districts Won and Efficiency Gap in Maryland. Simu-
lations of elections with 50 percent vote in Maryland using years 2012-2016 as the
seed. Line segment indicates half of total districts. n = 2000.
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4.3.4. North Carolina
In 2017, the Supreme Court ruled that North Carolina’s 1st and 12th dis-
tricts were racially gerrymandered (Cooper v. Harris , 2017). Though this was not
a partisan gerrymandering case, it still warrants examination due to the seem-
ingly large electoral advantage Republicans have in the state. In the state’s 2012
Congressional elections, Republicans won 9 of the state’s 13 seats, or 69.2%, while
winning only 48.7% of the statewide vote.
A simulation of North Carolina’s Congressional map (Figures 4.25 through
4.28) seems to indicate a large advantage for Republicans. Democrats won less
than half of the seats in every simulated election with a statewide vote of 50%
(Figure 4.28) while Republicans won nine or more of the state’s 13 seats over 95%
of the time. North Carolina also has the highest 50% vote mean efficiency gap,
24.26%, of any of the states examined.
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Figure 4.25: Scatter Plot of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in North Carolina.
Simulations of elections in North Carolina using years 2012-2016 as the seed. n =
2000 per step.
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Figure 4.26: Bernstein-Style Simulations of Elections in North Carolina. Using
years 2012-2016 as the seed and an increment of 1.
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Figure 4.27: Step Chart of Statewide Vote and Seats Won by Party in North
Carolina. Simulations of elections in North Carolina using years 2012-2016 as the
seed. Shading represents values between 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. n = 2000
per step.
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Figure 4.28: Bar Chart of Districts Won and Efficiency Gap in North Carolina.
Simulations of elections with 50 percent vote in North Carolina using years 2012-
2016 as the seed. Line segment indicates half of total districts. n = 2000.
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4.3.5. Arizona
In most states, Congressional maps are drawn by partisan legislative bod-
ies. A few states use independent commissions instead. Arizona’s Proposition 106
(2000) gave redistricting authority to a bipartisan independent commission, the
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. The commission consists of two
Republican members, two Democratic members, and one independent member. It
is tasked with drawing new districts for both state legislative maps and Congres-
sional maps. In 2016, Republicans won 52.4% of the statewide vote and five out
of the state’s nine Congressional seats, the most proportional result possible given
the vote.
The results of simulating elections for Arizona’s Congressional map are shown
in figures 4.29 through 4.32. The map appears to be far more balanced than any
of the other maps examined. Of the simulated elections with a statewide vote of
50% (Figure 4.32), Republicans won more than half of the nine districts 51.4% of
the time while Democrats won more than half 48.6% of the time. This produced
a mean efficiency gap of 0.33% in favor of Republicans, the lowest of all examined
states. Additionally, as the share of the vote increases, it appears that each party
converts the vote to seats at a similar rate (Figure 4.31).
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Figure 4.29: Scatter Plot of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in Arizona. Simulations
of elections in Arizona using years 2012-2016 as the seed. n = 2000 per step.
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Figure 4.30: Bernstein-Style Simulations of Elections in Arizona. Using years
2012-2016 as the seed and an increment of 1.
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Figure 4.31: Step Chart of Statewide Vote and Seats Won by Party in Arizona.
Simulations of elections in Arizona using years 2012-2016 as the seed. Shading
represents values between 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. n = 2000 per step.
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Figure 4.32: Bar Chart of Districts Won and Efficiency Gap in Arizona. Simu-
lations of elections with 50 percent vote in Arizona using years 2012-2016 as the
seed. Line segment indicates half of total districts. n = 2000.
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4.3.6. Ohio
Ohio is typically a popular state to discuss for its political implications.
Usually heralded as a battleground state every Presidential election, the state’s
Congressional map also warrants observation. Recent results suggest a Republican
advantage as the party won 75% of districts with only 57.4% of the statewide vote
in 2016 and 59% of the vote in 2014.
The results of a simulation of Ohio’s Congressional map are shown in Figures
4.33 through 4.36. It appears the map is more advantageous for Republicans, who
won more than half of the state’s 16 seats in all of the simulated elections with
a statewide vote of 50% (Figure 4.36). Additionally, the Republicans won 11 or
more seats more than 95% of the time, producing a mean efficiency gap of 22.47%,
the second largest behind only North Carolina.
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Figure 4.33: Scatter Plot of Statewide Vote and Seats Won in Ohio. Simulations
of elections in Ohio using years 2012-2016 as the seed. n = 2000 per step.
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Figure 4.34: Bernstein-Style Simulations of Elections in Ohio. Using years 2012-
2016 as the seed and an increment of 1.
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Figure 4.35: Step Chart of Statewide Vote and Seats Won by Party in Ohio. Sim-
ulations of elections in Ohio using years 2012-2016 as the seed. Shading represents
values between 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. n = 2000 per step.
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Mean EG: 22.47
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Figure 4.36: Bar Chart of Districts Won and Efficiency Gap in Ohio. Simulations
of elections with 50 percent vote in Ohio using years 2012-2016 as the seed. Line
segment indicates half of total districts. n = 2000.
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5. Conclusions
Partisan gerrymandering will continue to be a topic of interest in the coming
years as states will begin their redistricting process following the 2020 Census.
Our simulations provide a new way of examining and visualizing the votes-to-
seats relationship for a state Congressional map using past election data. We were
able to build upon Mira Bernstein’s method of uniformly simulating elections by
injecting a data-driven component of variation into the simulations. Additionally,
we were able to directly evaluate the accuracy of our simulations using a type of
cross-validation.
When examining our states of interest, we see that the efficiency gap, Bern-
stein’s uniform simulations, and our simulations are all capable of detecting a
partisan advantage. Our simulation process, however, is more robust to random
variation and provides a way of cutting through the noise and evaluating how likely
a certain outcome is. By accounting for variation, we can more easily distinguish
between an actual partisan advantage and a statistical anomaly in a relatively fair
state.
There are limits to what our simulation process can do. The presence of a
partisan advantage does not necessarily imply partisan gerrymandering has taken
place. There are numerous factors such as human geography and compliance with
the Voting Rights Act which can create a partisan advantage for one party even
without gerrymandering taking place. The simulations only examine the partisan
advantage present in a Congressional map and do nothing to evaluate the causes
of it. Despite this limitation, we believe our simulation process, when paired with
important context, provides a powerful tool for evaluating and visualizing the
partisan fairness of a Congressional map.
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6. Ideas for Future Research
6.1. Possible Test for Partisan Asymmetry
The simulation process we use for a single vote total is similar to the construc-
tion of a bootstrap confidence interval. We repeatedly sample with replacement
from our residual distribution. We then apply the residuals to our seed value to
determine the number of districts won for each sample. In our analysis, we ob-
serve the percentiles of the number of districts won similar to how one would select
the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles to construct a 95% bootstrap confidence interval.
Despite the similarities, there are added layers, such as selecting or constructing
a seed value and repeating the process for multiple vote totals, which separate
this process from a bootstrap interval construction. The similarities do, however,
suggest that a method of statistically testing for partisan asymmetry could be
developed using bootstrap confidence intervals and this simulation process as a
framework.
6.2. State Legislatures
Partisan gerrymandering is not just a concern at the national level, but
also the state level as well. In addition to redrawing U.S. Congressional maps,
states are also in charge of redrawing maps for their own state legislatures. This
means partisan gerrymandering could be used to provide a partisan advantage in
state houses as well. Our simulation process could be employed to examine the
relationship between statewide vote and seats won for these state legislative bodies
as well.
6.3. Analysis of Residuals
As mentioned previously, there did not appear to be any homoskedacity of
the residuals across states. It would be of interest to examine what factors are
driving the differing levels of variation in the state residuals. This could perhaps
be done by collecting more historical Congressional election data, or maybe by
examining the effects of different election laws by state. Differences could also be
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due to external political or demographic factors. Whatever the reasons, a better
understanding of what drives the variability in the residuals could allow for better
informed and more accurate simulations.
6.4. Effect of Fewer Data Restrictions
For the sake of simplicity, we chose to examine only situations in which
there was low third-party vote and there were no candidates running unopposed.
In reality, elections are not always that simple. It would be beneficial to observe
how effective our simulation process could be at examining less simple situations
using less simple data. Currently, we are incapable of conducting simulations of
California’s current Congressional map because there are a few districts in which
Republicans have yet to have a candidate on the general election ballot. Perhaps
performing a simulation on the maximal subset of usable districts could be an
adequate substitute for a simulation of the entire state. Regardless of the methods
used, a generalization of the simulation process to be able to reliably handle quirks
such as the one in California would be a valuable improvement.
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Table A.1: Full Cross-Validation Results. Districts won column contains actual
results for each election. Inner 50% and Inner 95% column denote whether or
not the actual result was between the 25th/75th and 2.5th/97.5th percentiles
respectively.
State Year Districts Won Percentage Inner 50% Inner 95%
Maryland 2008 1 (12.5%) 0% No No
Nebraska 2006 3 (100%) 0% No No
New Hampshire 2014 1 (50%) 0% No No
Kansas 2010 4 (100%) 1.05% No No
New Mexico 2010 1 (33.3%) 1.6% No No
North Carolina 2004 7 (53.8%) 2.95% No Yes
Kentucky 2010 4 (66.7%) 3.6% No Yes
New Hampshire 2012 0 (0%) 5.85% No Yes
Iowa 2010 2 (40%) 7% No Yes
Mississippi 2010 3 (75%) 10.4% No Yes
Colorado 2004 4 (57.1%) 10.5% No Yes
Indiana 2004 7 (77.8%) 12.3% No Yes
Virginia 2012 8 (72.7%) 13.4% No Yes
Ohio 2006 11 (61.1%) 15.95% No Yes
Connecticut 2004 3 (60%) 18.7% No Yes
Wisconsin 2010 5 (62.5%) 18.9% No Yes
North Carolina 2010 6 (46.2%) 19% No Yes
Mississippi 2008 1 (25%) 20.7% No Yes
New Mexico 2006 2 (66.7%) 21% No Yes
West Virginia 2010 2 (66.7%) 22.95% No Yes
Washington 2006 3 (33.3%) 26.25% Yes Yes
Iowa 2004 4 (80%) 30.25% Yes Yes
Kansas 2006 2 (50%) 38.65% Yes Yes
New Jersey 2012 6 (50%) 40% Yes Yes
Connecticut 2014 0 (0%) 41% Yes Yes
North Carolina 2012 9 (69.2%) 42.8% Yes Yes
Arkansas 2010 3 (75%) 43.75% Yes Yes
Washington 2004 3 (33.3%) 49.7% Yes Yes
Washington 2008 3 (33.3%) 50.8% Yes Yes
Colorado 2008 2 (28.6%) 54.35% Yes Yes
Connecticut 2006 1 (20%) 55% Yes Yes
Hawaii 2012 0 (0%) 65.15% Yes Yes
Michigan 2012 9 (64.3%) 65.5% Yes Yes
Nebraska 2008 3 (100%) 72.15% Yes Yes
New Hampshire 2006 0 (0%) 72.25% Yes Yes
Hawaii 2014 0 (0%) 73.65% Yes Yes
New Mexico 2004 2 (66.7%) 73.95% Yes Yes
Connecticut 2016 0 (0%) 75.45% Yes Yes
Wisconsin 2012 5 (62.5%) 77.1% Yes Yes
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Table A.1 (continued)
State Year Districts Won Percentage Inner 50% Inner 95%
Maryland 2014 1 (12.5%) 82.8% Yes Yes
North Carolina 2008 5 (38.5%) 83.7% Yes Yes
Iowa 2008 2 (40%) 83.9% Yes Yes
Wisconsin 2014 5 (62.5%) 85% Yes Yes
Indiana 2006 4 (44.4%) 89.25% Yes Yes
Indiana 2014 7 (77.8%) 89.9% Yes Yes
Kansas 2008 3 (75%) 90.15% Yes Yes
South Carolina 2006 4 (66.7%) 91.8% Yes Yes
New Jersey 2014 6 (50%) 94.35% Yes Yes
Kentucky 2012 5 (83.3%) 94.95% Yes Yes
Kentucky 2014 5 (83.3%) 95.75% Yes Yes
Nebraska 2004 3 (100%) 96.8% Yes Yes
Connecticut 2008 0 (0%) 96.9% Yes Yes
North Carolina 2016 10 (76.9%) 97.65% Yes Yes
Maryland 2004 2 (25%) 99.05% Yes Yes
South Carolina 2008 4 (66.7%) 99.6% Yes Yes
Connecticut 2012 0 (0%) 99.75% Yes Yes
Missouri 2004 5 (55.6%) 99.8% Yes Yes
South Carolina 2016 6 (85.7%) 99.85% Yes Yes
Maryland 2012 1 (12.5%) 99.9% Yes Yes
Missouri 2006 5 (55.6%) 99.95% Yes Yes
Hawaii 2004 0 (0%) 100% Yes Yes
Hawaii 2006 0 (0%) 100% Yes Yes
Hawaii 2008 0 (0%) 100% Yes Yes
Hawaii 2010 0 (0%) 100% Yes Yes
Maine 2016 1 (50%) 100% Yes Yes
New Hampshire 2004 2 (100%) 100% Yes Yes
New Hampshire 2008 0 (0%) 100% Yes Yes
New Mexico 2012 1 (33.3%) 100% Yes Yes
New Mexico 2014 1 (33.3%) 100% Yes Yes
New Mexico 2016 1 (33.3%) 100% Yes Yes
Oregon 2006 1 (20%) 100% Yes Yes
West Virginia 2004 1 (33.3%) 100% Yes Yes
West Virginia 2006 1 (33.3%) 100% Yes Yes
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Raw Data Script
# #######################################################################
#
# program: raw_data.r
# author: Zachary Morgan
#
# purpose: To take FEC election spreadsheets and compile a
# congressional election raw dataset
#
# inputs: CSV files which were converted from the .xls files
# available on the FEC website.
# https://transition .fec.gov/pubrec/ electionresults .shtml
#
# outputs: a raw dataset which can be later molded
# into an analysis dataset.
#
# run order: 1
#
# #######################################################################
library(dplyr)
trimwsnb <- function(S) {
# Function for trimming leading a trailing whitespace including non -breaking
gsub("(^\\s+)|(\\s+$)", "", S)
}
states <- c('Alabama ','Alaska ','Arizona ','Arkansas ','California ','Colorado ',
'Connecticut ','Delaware ','Florida ','Georgia ','Hawaii ','Idaho',
'Illinois ','Indiana ','Iowa','Kansas ','Kentucky ','Maine ',
'Maryland ','Massachusetts ','Michigan ','Minnesota ','Mississippi ',
'Missouri ','Montana ','Nebraska ','Nevada ','New Hampshire ',
'New Jersey ','New Mexico ','New York','North Carolina ',
'North Dakota ','Ohio','Oklahoma ','Oregon ','Pennsylvania ',
'Rhode Island ','South Carolina ','South Dakota ','Tennessee ',
'Texas ','Utah','Vermont ','Virginia ','Washington ','West Virginia ',
'Wisconsin ','Wyoming ')
# Creating empty raw dataset with desired structure
raw.shell <- data.frame(
Year <- numeric(),
State <- character (),
District <- numeric(),
Republican <- numeric(),
Democratic <- numeric(),
Other <- numeric(),
Total <- numeric(),
Unopposed <- logical ()
)
raw <- raw.shell
# Importing CSV files and performing minor cleanups
for (y in seq(from =2004 ,to=2016,by=2)) {
d <- read.csv(paste0(y,".csv"), stringsAsFactors=FALSE)
d <- d[,colSums(is.na(d))<nrow(d)]
d <- d[is.na(d[,c(1)])== FALSE , ]
chars <- sapply(d,is.character)
d <- data.frame(cbind(sapply(d[,chars],trimwsnb),d[,!chars ]))
d %>% mutate_if(is.factor ,as.character) -> d
# Removing rows for non - Congressional elections ,rows for Louisiana ,
# and rows for non -states.
d <- d[d$STATE %in% states , ]
house.races <- grep("[0 -9]{1 ,2}",d$D)
d <- d[house.races ,]
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# Removing some special elections
specs <- grep("\\*$",d$D)
if (length(specs) > 0) d <- d[- specs , ]
# Renaming variables for consistency
if (y < 2012) {
names(d)[names(d) == 'GENERAL '] <- 'GENERAL.VOTES '
names(d)[names(d) == 'DISTRICT '] <- 'D'
}
ind <- grep("COMBINED",names(d))[1]
colnames(d)[ind] <- 'COMBINED '
# Recoding unopposed elections to -1
unopp <- grep("Unopposed",d$GENERAL.VOTES)
d$GENERAL.VOTES[unopp] <- rep("-1", length(unopp ))
# Only retaining rows with general election data
d <- d[! d$GENERAL.VOTES %in% c("","n/a"),]
# Converting GENERAL.VOTES and COMBINED to numeric (if after 2004)
d$GENERAL.VOTES <- as.numeric(gsub(",","",d$GENERAL.VOTES ))
if (y > 2004) d$COMBINED <- gsub(",","",d$COMBINED)
# Removing * from PARTY
d$PARTY <- gsub("\\*","",d$PARTY)
# Recoding PARTY values when necessary
d$PARTY <- gsub("REP|GOP","R",d$PARTY ,ignore.case=TRUE)
d$PARTY <- gsub("DEM","D",d$PARTY ,ignore.case=TRUE)
# Handling two states with different Democratic Party names
d$PARTY[d$STATE == "Minnesota"] <- gsub("DFL","D",
d$PARTY[d$STATE == "Minnesota"])
d$PARTY[d$STATE == "North Dakota"] <- gsub("DNL","D",
d$PARTY[d$STATE == "North Dakota"])
# Handling scenairo where candidate is listed for multiple parties
d$PARTY <- gsub("R/.*|.*/R","R",d$PARTY)
d$PARTY <- gsub("D/.*|.*/D","D",d$PARTY)
# Removing rows where GENERAL.VOTES contained invalid numeric data
d <- d[is.na(d$GENERAL.VOTES) == FALSE , ]
# Using "combined" column where relavent (if after 2004)
if (y > 2004) {
d$GENERAL.VOTES[! d$COMBINED == ""] <-
as.numeric(d$COMBINED[! d$COMBINED == ""])
}
# Cleaning up district column
to.remove <- grep("UNEXPIRED",d$D)
if (length(to.remove) > 0) d <- d[- to.remove , ]
d$D <- trimws(d$D)
d$D <- as.numeric(substr(d$D,1,2))
at.large <- which(d$D == 0)
d$D[at.large] <- rep(1,length(at.large))
# Looping through each state and district to extract the desired values
raw.temp <- raw.shell
for (s in states ){
num_dis <- max(unique(d$D[d$STATE == s]))
for (i in 1:num_dis){
d.sub <- d[d$STATE == s & d$D == i, ]
# Calculating Republican total
# If multiple Republicans ran , their vote totals were added together.
rep <- d.sub$GENERAL.VOTES[d.sub$PARTY == "R" & d.sub$TOTAL.VOTES ==""]
if (length(rep) > 1) rep <- sum(rep)
if (length(rep )==0) rep <- c(0)
# Similarly calculating Democratic total
dem <- d.sub$GENERAL.VOTES[d.sub$PARTY == "D" & d.sub$TOTAL.VOTES ==""]
if (length(dem) > 1) dem <- sum(dem)
if (length(dem )==0) dem <- c(0)
56
# Extracting total votes
tot <- d.sub$GENERAL.VOTES[grep("District Votes:",d.sub$TOTAL.VOTES )]
if (length(tot )==0) tot <- c(0)
# Determining if a candidate was running unopposed
if (rep==-1 | dem==-1) {
un <- TRUE
rep <- NA
dem <- NA
}
else un <- FALSE
# Putting the data in desired format
row <- data.frame(
Year = c(y),
State = c(s),
District = c(i),
Republican = c(rep),
Democratic = c(dem),
Total = c(tot),
Unopposed = c(un)
)
row$Other <- row$Total - row$Republican - row$Democratic
raw.temp <- rbind(raw.temp , row)
}
}
raw <- rbind(raw ,raw.temp)
}
# Outputting raw dataset
write.csv(raw , file="raw.csv",row.names = FALSE)
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Analysis Data Script
# #######################################################################
#
# program: analysis_data.r
# author: Zachary Morgan
#
# purpose: To take previously constructed raw dataset to create an
# analysis dataset for use in statistical analysis and
# simulations .
#
# inputs: raw dataset created in raw_data.r program
#
# outputs: an analysis dataset which can be easily used to perform
# desired analysis and simulations .
#
# run order: 2
#
# #######################################################################
library(dplyr)
raw <- read.csv("raw.csv")
elections <- raw
# Creating Percentage Columns
elections$Rep_perc <- (elections$Republican /elections$Total)*100
elections$Dem_perc <- (elections$Democratic /elections$Total)*100
elections$Oth_perc <- (elections$Other / elections$Total)*100
# Since new congressional maps were used beginning in 2002 ,
# data from 2000 doesn 't add anything to our analysis
included <- elections[elections$Year != 2000 ,]
included <- included[rowSums(is.na(included )) != ncol(included),]
# Creating an adjusted unopposed column which also includes districts
# where only one major party candidate ran which we deem to be an
# " essentially unopposed" election.
ind = which(included$Rep_perc > included$Dem_perc)
included$min_party_perc <- included$Rep_perc
included$min_party_perc[ind] <- included$Dem_perc[ind]
included$Unopp.adj <- included$Unopposed
included$Unopp.adj[which(included$min_party_perc == 0)] <- rep.int(
TRUE ,table(included$min_party_perc )[1])
# The following section creates a column , map , which serves to
# keep different congressional maps seperate.
state_level <- data.frame(State=character (), Year=numeric(),
map=numeric ())
for (s in unique(included$State)) {
for (y in unique(included$Year)) {
if (! s %in% c("Maine","Georgia","Texas","Florida")) {
if (y < 2012) m <- 1
else m <- 2
}
else if (s=="Maine") {
if (y == 2002) m <- 1
else if (y < 2012) m <- 2
else m <- 3
}
else if (s=="Georgia") {
if (y < 2006) m <- 1
else if (y == 2006) m <- 2
else if (y < 2012) m <- 3
else m <- 4
}
else if (s=="Texas") {
if (y == 2002) m <- 1
else if (y == 2004) m <- 2
else if (y < 2012) m <- 3
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else m <- 4
}
else if (s=="Florida") {
if (y <2012) m <- 1
else if (y <2016) m<-2
else m<-3
}
row <- data.frame(State=c(s), Year=c(y), map=c(m))
state_level <- rbind(state_level , row)
}
}
included <- merge(included , state_level , by=c("State", "Year"))
# Adjusting Republican and Democratic Percentages for Third Party Vote
main.party.total <- included$Rep_perc + included$Dem_perc
included$Rep_perc.adj <- (included$Rep_perc / main.party.total) *100
included$Dem_perc.adj <- (included$Dem_perc / main.party.total) *100
# Computing lag columns which have the previous election 's
# district percentages for the same congressional map , if applicable .
# Also adding a lag column for adjusted unopposed
included <- included[order(included$State ,included$District ,included$Year), ]
included <- included %>% group_by(State , District , map) %>%
mutate(lag.Rep_perc = dplyr::lag(Rep_perc , n = 1, default=NA))
included <- included %>% group_by(State , District , map) %>%
mutate(lag.Dem_perc = dplyr::lag(Dem_perc , n = 1, default=NA))
included <- included %>% group_by(State , District , map) %>%
mutate(lag.Rep_perc.adj = dplyr::lag(Rep_perc.adj , n = 1, default=NA))
included <- included %>% group_by(State , District , map) %>%
mutate(lag.Dem_perc.adj = dplyr::lag(Dem_perc.adj , n = 1, default=NA))
included <- included %>% group_by(State , District , map) %>%
mutate(lag.Oth_perc = dplyr::lag(Oth_perc , n = 1, default=NA))
included <- included %>% group_by(State , District , map) %>%
mutate(lag.Unopp.adj = dplyr::lag(Unopp.adj , n = 1, default=NA))
# Computing the shift in party support from the previous election , if applicable
included <- included[order(included$State , included$Year , included$District),]
included$Rep_shift.adj <- included$Rep_perc.adj - included$lag.Rep_perc.adj
included$Dem_shift.adj <- included$Dem_perc.adj - included$lag.Dem_perc.adj
# Writing the shifts as NA where exclusion criteria apply
# If third party support is over 5% for current or previous year
# If the district was essentially unnoposed for the current or previous year
included$Rep_shift.adj[is.na(included$Rep_shift.adj) == FALSE &
(included$Unopp.adj == TRUE | included$lag.Unopp.adj == TRUE |
included$Oth_perc > 5 | included$lag.Oth_perc > 5)] <-
rep(NA , length(included$Rep_shift.adj[is.na(included$Rep_shift.adj) == FALSE &
(included$Unopp.adj == TRUE | included$lag.Unopp.adj == TRUE |
included$Oth_perc > 5 | included$lag.Oth_perc > 5)]))
included$Dem_shift.adj[is.na(included$Dem_shift.adj) == FALSE &
(included$Unopp.adj == TRUE | included$lag.Unopp.adj == TRUE |
included$Oth_perc > 5 | included$lag.Oth_perc > 5)] <-
rep(NA , length(included$Dem_shift.adj[is.na(included$Dem_shift.adj) == FALSE &
(included$Unopp.adj == TRUE | included$lag.Unopp.adj == TRUE |
included$Oth_perc > 5 | included$lag.Oth_perc > 5)]))
# function for writing certain observations as NA where appropriate
drop <- function (id) {
out <- included
out$Rep_shift.adj[out$State == id[1] & out$Year == id[2] &
out$District == id[3]] <- NA
out$Dem_shift.adj[out$State == id[1] & out$Year == id[2] &
out$District == id[3]] <- NA
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return(out)
}
# excluding appropraite observations
included <- drop(c("Ohio" ,2006 ,18))
# Writing the shifts as NA if only one shift is available for a given state & year
n.adj <- aggregate.data.frame(
included$Rep_shift.adj[is.na(included$Rep_shift.adj) == FALSE],
by=c(list(included$State[is.na(included$Rep_shift.adj) == FALSE]),
list(included$Year[is.na(included$Rep_shift.adj) == FALSE ])), FUN=length)
names(n.adj) <- c("State","Year","n.adj")
included <- merge(included , n.adj , by=c("State", "Year"), all.x=TRUE)
ind <- which(is.na(included$n.adj) == FALSE & included$n.adj == 1)
included$Rep_shift.adj[ind] <- rep(NA, length(ind))
included$Dem_shift.adj[ind] <- rep(NA, length(ind))
# Computing state -wide mean party shifts and creating a column for the
# number of districts in a state.
means <- aggregate.data.frame(included[, c("Rep_shift.adj", "Dem_shift.adj")],
by=c(list(included$State), list(included$Year)), FUN=mean , na.rm=TRUE)
counts <- aggregate.data.frame(included$District , by=c(list(included$State),
list(included$Year)), FUN=length)
names(means)<-c("State","Year","Rep_shift_sw","Dem_shift_sw")
names(counts) <- c("State","Year","num_dis")
# Labeling states as small/medium/large based on the number of districts
size <- function (nums) {
s <- character ()
for (n in nums) {
if (n <= 9) s<-c(s, "Small (9 or Fewer)") else if (n <= 19) s<-
c(s,"Medium (Between 10 and 19)") else s<-c(s,"Large (20 or More)")
}
return (s)
}
counts$size <- sapply(counts$num_dis , FUN=size)
summary <- merge(means , counts , by=c("State", "Year"))
analysis <- merge(included , summary , by=c("State", "Year"))
# Computing residual shifts as the shifts in excess of the state wide shifts.
analysis$Rep_shift.resid <- analysis$Rep_shift.adj - analysis$Rep_shift_sw
analysis$Dem_shift.resid <- analysis$Dem_shift.adj - analysis$Dem_shift_sw
# Removing the state of Louisiana
analysis <- analysis[analysis$State != "Louisiana", ]
# Creating an inclusion variable
analysis$incl <- rep(TRUE ,nrow(analysis ))
where.false <- which(analysis$Oth_perc >= 5 | analysis$Unopp.adj == TRUE)
analysis$incl[where.false] <- rep(FALSE ,length(where.false))
# Outputting dataset
write.csv(analysis , file="analysis.csv",row.names = FALSE)
60
Plots Script
# #######################################################################
#
# program: plots.r
# author: Zachary Morgan
#
# purpose: To produce plots and summaries which help to understand
# and visualize the analysis dataset
#
# inputs: analysis dataset created in analysis_data.r program
#
# outputs: various plots and summaries.
#
# run order: 3
#
# #######################################################################
# ---- preplot
library(dplyr)
library(ggplot2)
# Importing dataset for analysis
imported <- read.csv("analysis.csv")
analysis <- imported[is.na(imported$Rep_shift.adj) == FALSE &
imported$num_dis > 1, ]
# Changing applicable varibles to factor type
analysis$Year <- factor(analysis$Year)
analysis$Unopposed <- factor(analysis$Unopposed)
analysis$Unopp.adj <- factor(analysis$Unopp.adj)
analysis$map <- factor(analysis$map)
analysis$size <- factor(analysis$size)
# ######################################################################
# Theme to be used for plots
theme <- theme(plot.title=element_text(size=12,
face="bold",
#family =" American Typewriter ",
color="black",
hjust =0.5,
lineheight =1.2),
plot.subtitle=element_text(size=9,
#face =" bold",
#family =" American Typewriter ",
color="black",
hjust =0.5,
lineheight =1.2),
axis.title=element_text(size=9),
plot.caption=element_text(size=7),
legend.title = element_text(size=9, color = "black"),
legend.text=element_text(size=7),
legend.justification=c(1,0),
legend.position='right ',
legend.background = element_blank(),
legend.key = element_blank(),
legend.margin=margin (-3,0,-3,0))
colors <- c("#E91D0E","#232066")
# ----
# ######################################################################
# Plot of data points vs variance in shifts
# grouped by state and year
grouped <- group_by(analysis , State , Year)
spread <- summarize(grouped , iqr=IQR(Rep_shift.resid),
var=var(Rep_shift.resid),
range=range(Rep_shift.resid )[2]- range(Rep_shift.resid )[1],
data.points=length(Rep_shift.resid))
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ggplot(spread , aes(x=State ,y=var ,color=data.points ,shape=Year)) +
geom_point() +
theme(axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 90, hjust = 1))
ggplot(spread , aes(x=data.points , y=var)) + geom_point ()
# ######################################################################
# Histogram and Normal Prob Plot of Repub District Shift Residuals
# ---- residhist
resids <- unlist(analysis$Rep_shift.resid)
# Creating fitted histogram
bw <- 0.5
hist <- qplot(resids , geom = "histogram",
breaks = seq(min(resids)-bw/2,max(resids )+bw/2, bw),
colour = I("black"), fill = I("white"),
xlab = "Shift in District Level Support (%)",
ylab = "Count",
main=NULL) +
theme +
stat_function(
fun = function(x, mean , sd, n, bw){
dnorm(x = x, mean = mean , sd = sd) * n * bw
},
args = c(mean = mean(resids), sd =sd(resids),
n = length(which(is.na(resids) == FALSE)), bw = bw))
# Normal Probability Plot
npp <- ggplot(data.frame(resids =(resids -mean(resids ))/sd(resids)),
aes(sample = resids )) +
stat_qq() +
geom_segment(aes(x=-4,y=-4,xend=4,yend =4)) +
labs(title=NULL ,x="Theoretical",y="Sample") +
theme
grid.arrange(hist ,npp ,ncol =2)
# ######################################################################
# Boxplots of residual values by state , by year , and by size.
# ---- boxstate
ggplot(analysis , aes(y=Rep_shift.resid , x=State)) +
geom_boxplot(aes(group=State )) +
labs(title=NULL ,
y="Residual Shift (%)", x="State") + theme +
theme(axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 90, hjust = 1))
# ---- boxyear
ggplot(analysis , aes(y=Rep_shift.resid , x=Year)) +
geom_boxplot(aes(group=Year)) +
labs(title=NULL ,
y="Residual Shift (%)", x="Year") + theme
# ---- boxsize
ggplot(analysis , aes(y=Rep_shift.resid , x=size)) +
geom_boxplot(aes(group=size)) +
labs(title=NULL ,
y="Residual Shift (%)", x="Year") + theme +
theme(axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 45, hjust = 1, vjust =1))
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Simulation Script
# #######################################################################
#
# program: simulation .r
# author: Zachary Morgan
#
# purpose: To perform simulations using analysis dataset
#
# inputs: analysis dataset created in analysis_data.r program
#
# outputs: simulation results and plots
#
# run order: 4
#
# #######################################################################
# ---- presim
library(tidyr)
library(dplyr)
library(car)
library(ggplot2)
library(grid)
library(gridExtra)
# Importing dataset for analysis
imported <- read.csv("analysis.csv")
analysis <- imported[is.na(imported$Rep_shift.adj) == FALSE &
imported$num_dis > 1, ]
# Changing applicable varibles to factor type
analysis$Year <- factor(analysis$Year)
analysis$Unopposed <- factor(analysis$Unopposed)
analysis$Unopp.adj <- factor(analysis$Unopp.adj)
analysis$map <- factor(analysis$map)
analysis$size <- factor(analysis$size)
# ######################################################################
# Theme to be used for plots
theme <- theme(plot.title=element_text(size=12,
face="bold",
#family =" American Typewriter ",
color="black",
hjust =0.5,
lineheight =1.2),
plot.subtitle=element_text(size=9,
#face =" bold",
#family =" American Typewriter ",
color="black",
hjust =0.5,
lineheight =1.2),
axis.title=element_text(size=9),
plot.caption=element_text(size=7),
legend.title = element_text(size=9, color = "black"),
legend.text=element_text(size=7),
legend.justification=c(1,0),
legend.position='right',
legend.background = element_blank(),
legend.key = element_blank(),
legend.margin=margin (-3,0,-3,0))
colors <- c("#E91D0E","#232066")
# ######################################################################
# Efficiency Gap ( simplified version) function
# ---- effgap
EG <- function(vote ,seats) {
if (! length(vote) == length(seats)) {
print("Vector lengths do not match")
return(NULL)
}
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(100*seats - 50) - 2*(100*vote - 50)
}
# #####################################################################
# Uniform simulation
# ---- uniformsim
step.func <- function(X,votes ,seats ,step) {
Y <- numeric ()
for (x in X) {
d <- abs(x-votes)
ind <- which(d == min(d))
if (length(ind) == 1 & d[ind [1]] < step/2) {
Y = c(Y,seats[ind])
} else {
Y = c(Y,NA)
}
}
return(Y)
}
uniform.sim <- function(state ,year ,step){
to.use <- imported[imported$State == state & imported$Year == year , ]
seed <- to.use$Rep_perc.adj
num_dis <- length(seed)
min_shift <- -30
max_shift <- 20
points <- data.frame(vote=numeric(),seats=numeric(),seed=character ())
shifts <- seq(from=min_shift , to=max_shift , by=step)
for (shift in shifts) {
elec <- seed + shift
v <- mean(elec)
s <- length(which(elec > 50))
if (shift ==0){
is.seed <- "Seed"
}
else is.seed <- ""
point <- data.frame(vote=c(v),seats=c(s),seed=c(is.seed))
points <- rbind(points , point)
}
# Scatter Plot of Simulation
scat <- ggplot(points , aes(x=vote , y=seats)) +
geom_point(alpha=1,aes(size=seed)) +
geom_segment(aes(x=50,y=0,xend=50,yend=num_dis),
color=I('black '),size =.25) +
geom_segment(aes(x=0,y=num_dis/2,xend =100, yend=num_dis/2),
color=I('black '),size =.25) +
stat_function(fun=step.func ,args=list(
votes=points$vote[points$seed==""],
seats=points$seats[points$seed==""],
step=1),
n=10000 , size=1,na.rm=TRUE) +
labs(title=NULL , subtitle=NULL ,
x="Republican Vote (%)", y="Number of Seats Won",size="") +
scale_size_manual(breaks = c("Seed"), values=c(0 ,3.5)) + theme
return(list(data=points ,scat=scat))
}
# ######################################################################
# ---- sim
# Simulation of Partisan Symmetry
# Seed generation function
gen.seed <- function(to.use , y) {
# Standardizing for year to year shifts by expressing each
# percentage in year.start terms
shift.from.year1 <- 0
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if (length(y) > 1) {
for (i in 2: length(y)) {
shift.from.year1 <- shift.from.year1+
to.use$Rep_shift_sw[to.use$Year == y[i]][1]
to.use$Rep_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]] <-
to.use$Rep_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]] - shift.from.year1
to.use$Dem_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]] <-
100 - to.use$Rep_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]]
}
}
to.use <- to.use[! is.na(to.use$Rep_perc.adj), ]
# Deriving seed values if possible
grouped <- group_by(to.use[to.use$incl == TRUE , ], District)
rep_seed <- unlist(summarize(grouped , val=mean(Rep_perc.adj))$val)
num_dis = to.use$num_dis [1]
if (length(rep_seed) < num_dis) {
print("Unable to complete seed.")
return(NULL)
}
return(rep_seed)
}
# Core simulation function
sim <- function(s,year.start , year.end , means=NA, n=2000, fill.incom=TRUE ,
nw.distrib=FALSE ,cross.validate=FALSE ,invert.seed=FALSE){
# s <- State
# year.start <- First year to use in seed
# year.end <- last year to use in seed
# means <- statewide mean to be used for simulation
# n <- Number of Simulated Datapoints per step
# fill.incom <- Determine whether or not to fill in seed gaps
# nw.distrib <- Logical variable stating whether or not to use
# nationwide distribution of residuals
# cross.validate <- Specify whether or not to include selected
# years in residual distribution to sample from
# invert.seed <- Specifty whether or not to select the years NOT
# specified which share the same congressional map
# Selecting distribution of residuals to sample from
if (nw.distrib) {
resids <- analysis[,c("Year","State","Rep_shift.resid")]
} else if (! nw.distrib) {
resids <- analysis[analysis$State == s,
c("Year","State","Rep_shift.resid")]
}
if (cross.validate == TRUE) {
resids <- resids[! (resids$State == s & resids$Year %in%
seq(from=year.start , to=year.end+2,by=2)),]
}
resids <- unlist(resids$Rep_shift.resid)
if (length(resids) == 0) {
print("No residuals available for desired year(s)")
return(NULL)
}
# Creating sequence of years to be used
y <- seq(from=year.start ,to=year.end ,by=2)
# Ensuring all selected years come from the same congressional map
if (length(unique(imported$map[imported$State==s &
imported$Year %in% y])) > 1) {
print("Years come from different congressional maps.")
return(NULL)
}
map <- unlist(imported$map[imported$State==s &
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imported$Year %in% y])[1]
# Taking relavent subset of data
to.use <- imported[imported$State==s & imported$Year %in% y, ]
if (is.null(nrow(to.use))) {
print("No included records for desired year")
return(NULL)
}
# Detecting incomplete seeds if necessary
if (fill.incom==FALSE & length(which(to.use$incl==FALSE)) > 0) {
print("Seed incomplete.")
return(NULL)
}
num_dis = to.use$num_dis [1]
if (num_dis == 1) {
print("Single district state")
return(NULL)
}
rep_seed <- gen.seed(to.use , y)
if (is.null(rep_seed)) return (NULL)
seed_mean <- mean(rep_seed)
# If means is NA , assigning it to be mean of supplied years
if (is.na(means [1]) == TRUE) means <- mean(rep_seed)
# Calculating wins
rep_wins <- length(which(rep_seed > 50))
# Initializing data frame
cum_freq <- data.frame(dis_won=c(rep_wins),mean=c(seed_mean),
freq=c(NA),perc=c(NA),seed=c(TRUE))
# Inverting seed if necessary
if (invert.seed) {
to.use <- imported[imported$State==s &
(! imported$Year %in% y) & imported$map == map , ]
if (is.null(nrow(to.use))) {
print("No included records for desired year")
return(NULL)
}
rep_seed <- gen.seed(to.use ,
unique(imported$Year[(! imported$Year %in% y) &
imported$map == map & imported$State == s]))
if (is.null(rep_seed)) return (NULL)
seed_mean <- mean(rep_seed)
}
# Performing a simulation
for (m in means) {
#m <- 50
i <- m-mean(rep_seed) # Calculating specified statewide shift
simulation <- rep(NULL ,n)
for (j in 1:num_dis) {
# Ensureing no impossible values are generated by truncating the
# sample distribution .
to.sample <- resids[rep_seed[j] + resids + i >= 0 & rep_seed[j]
+ resids + i <= 100]
sim <- sample(to.sample ,size=n,replace=TRUE)
simulation <- cbind(simulation , sim)
}
simulation <- as.data.frame(apply(simulation , MARGIN = 2,
FUN="-", rowMeans(simulation )))
simulation <- as.data.frame(t(apply(simulation , MARGIN = 1,
FUN="+", rep_seed ))) + i
simulation$dis_won <- rowSums(simulation [,1:num_dis] > 50)
simulation$mean <- rowMeans(simulation [,1:num_dis])
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simulation$seed <- rep(FALSE , n)
freqs <- as.data.frame(table(simulation$dis_won))
names(freqs) <- c("dis_won","freq")
freqs$dis_won <- as.numeric(as.character(freqs$dis_won))
freqs$perc <- 100 * freqs$freq / n
freqs$mean <- rep(m,nrow(freqs ))
freqs$seed <- rep(FALSE ,nrow(freqs))
cum_freq <- rbind(cum_freq , freqs)
}
return(cum_freq)
}
# Simulation function with plots
sim.range <- function(s,year.start ,year.end ,n=2000, step=1,
fill.incom=TRUE ,nw.distrib=FALSE) {
# s <- State
# year.start <- First year to use in seed
# year.end <- last year to use in seed
# n <- Number of Simulated Datapoints per step
# step <- Difference between simulated shifts
# nw.distrib <- Logical variable stating whether or not to use
# nationwide distribution of residuals
# Creating sequence of years to be used
y <- seq(from=year.start ,to=year.end ,by=2)
# Taking relavent subset of data
to.use <- imported[imported$State==s & imported$Year %in% y, ]
if (is.null(nrow(to.use))) {
print("No included records for desired year")
return(NULL)
}
# Ensuring all selected years come from the same congressional map
if (length(unique(to.use$map)) > 1) {
print("Years come from different congressional maps.")
return(NULL)
}
# Detective incomplete seeds if necessary
if (fill.incom==FALSE & length(which(to.use$incl==FALSE)) > 0) {
print("Seed incomplete.")
return(NULL)
}
# Standardizing for year to year shifts by expressing each
# percentage in year.start terms
shift.from.year1 <- 0
if (length(y) > 1) {
for (i in 2: length(y)) {
shift.from.year1 <- shift.from.year1+
to.use$Rep_shift_sw[to.use$Year == y[i]][1]
to.use$Rep_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]] <-
to.use$Rep_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]] - shift.from.year1
to.use$Dem_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]] <-
100 - to.use$Rep_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]]
}
}
# Deriving seed values if possible
grouped <- group_by(to.use[to.use$incl == TRUE , ], District)
rep_seed <- unlist(summarize(grouped , val=mean(Rep_perc.adj))$val)
seed_mean <- mean(rep_seed)
num_dis = to.use$num_dis [1]
if (length(rep_seed) < num_dis) {
print("Unable to complete seed.")
return(NULL)
}
# Determing minimum and maximum shifts.
# Ensuring no more than 5% of resids dist would lead to impossible percentages
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q <- quantile(analysis$Rep_shift.resid ,probs=c(.05 ,.95))
min_shift <- - q[1] - min(rep_seed)
max_shift <- 100 - q[2] - max(rep_seed)
min_mean <- ceiling(min_shift + seed_mean)
max_mean <- floor(max_shift + seed_mean)
# Creting sequence of shifts
#state_shifts <- seq(min_shift , max_shift , by=step)
state_means <- seq(min_mean , max_mean , by=step)
steps <- length(state_means)
# Simulating shifts
cum_freq <- sim(s=s,year.start = year.start , year.end=year.end , means=state_means ,
fill.incom=TRUE , nw.distrib = nw.distrib , n=n)
cum_freq$eg <- EG(cum_freq$mean/100, cum_freq$dis_won/num_dis)
cum_sim <- cbind(cum_freq[cum_freq$seed == TRUE , c("dis_won","mean","seed")],est=c(NA))
for (m in unique(unlist(cum_freq$mean ))) {
data <- rep(cum_freq$dis_won[cum_freq$mean == m & cum_freq$seed==FALSE],
cum_freq$freq[cum_freq$mean == m & cum_freq$seed== FALSE])
q <- quantile(data , probs=c(0.025 ,0.25 ,0.75 ,0.975))
sim_means <- data.frame(dis_won=c(round(mean(data))),mean=c(m),
seed=c(FALSE),est=c("mean"))
sim_025 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[1]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(2.5))
sim_25 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[2]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(25))
sim_75 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[3]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(75))
sim_975 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[4]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(97.5))
cum_sim <- rbind(cum_sim , sim_means)
cum_sim <- rbind(cum_sim , sim_025)
cum_sim <- rbind(cum_sim , sim_25)
cum_sim <- rbind(cum_sim , sim_75)
cum_sim <- rbind(cum_sim , sim_975)
}
cum_sim$Bonus <- (100*cum_sim$dis_won / num_dis) - cum_sim$mean
cum_freq$Bonus <- (100*cum_freq$dis_won / num_dis) - cum_freq$mean
cum_sim$seed.plot <- rep("",nrow(cum_sim))
cum_sim$seed.plot[cum_sim$seed] <- "Seed"
cum_freq$seed.plot <- rep("",nrow(cum_freq))
cum_freq$seed.plot[cum_freq$seed] <- "Seed"
cum_sim$Bonus.party <- rep(NA , nrow(cum_sim))
adv <- which(cum_sim$Bonus > 0)
cum_sim$Bonus.party[adv] <- rep("Republican",length(adv))
disadv <- which(cum_sim$Bonus < 0)
cum_sim$Bonus.party[disadv] <- rep("Democratic",length(disadv ))
cum_freq$Bonus.party <- rep(NA , nrow(cum_freq))
adv <- which(cum_freq$Bonus > 0)
cum_freq$Bonus.party[adv] <- rep("Republican",length(adv))
disadv <- which(cum_freq$Bonus < 0)
cum_freq$Bonus.party[disadv] <- rep("Democratic",length(disadv ))
cum_sim$effgap <- (100*cum_sim$dis_won / num_dis - 50) - 2*(cum_sim$mean -50)
absmean.effgap <- mean(abs(cum_sim$effgap ))
#print(absmean.effgap)
# Labels for plots
t <- "Statewide Vote and Seats Won"
if (length(y) == 1) {
st <- paste("Simulations of Elections in ",s," Using ",y," as the Seed",sep="")
} else if (length(y) > 1) {
st <- paste("Simulations of Elections in ",s," Using Years ",
paste0(year.start ,"-",year.end)," as Seed",sep="")
}
xlab <- "Statewide Republican Vote (%)"
ylab <- "Number of Districts Won by Republicans"
capt <- paste("n=",n," / step",sep="")
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# Scatter Plot of Simulation
scat <- ggplot(cum_freq , aes(x=mean , y=dis_won , color=Bonus.party , alpha=perc ,
size=seed.plot),na.rm=TRUE) +
geom_point(na.rm=TRUE) +
geom_segment(aes(x=50,y=0,xend=50,yend=num_dis),color=I('black '),size =.125) +
geom_segment(aes(x=max(min(cum_freq$mean)-5,0),y=num_dis/2,
xend=min(max(cum_freq$mean )+5,100), yend=num_dis/2),color=I('black '),size =.125) +
labs(title=NULL , subtitle=NULL , x=xlab , y=ylab ,color="Winner 's Bonus",caption=NULL) +
scale_color_manual(breaks=c("Republican","Democratic"),values=rev(colors )) +
scale_alpha("Relative\nFrequency (%)",range = c(0, 1),limits=c(0 ,100)) +
scale_size_manual(NULL ,breaks = c("Seed"), values=c(1.5 ,3.5)) +
theme
# Scatter Plot By Party
cum_freq.party <- cum_freq
repub <- which(cum_freq.party$mean > 50)
dem <- which(cum_freq.party$mean < 50)
repdem <- which(cum_freq.party$mean == 50)
cum_freq.party <- rbind(cum_freq.party ,cum_freq.party[repdem , ])
repdem <- which(cum_freq.party$mean == 50)
cum_freq.party$party <- rep(NA,nrow(cum_freq.party))
cum_freq.party$party[repub] <- "Republican"
cum_freq.party$party[dem] <- "Democratic"
cum_freq.party$party[repdem] <- c(rep("Republican",length(repdem)/2),
rep("Democratic",length(repdem)/2))
cum_freq.party$mean[cum_freq.party$party=="Democratic"] <-
100 - cum_freq.party$mean[cum_freq.party$party=="Democratic"]
cum_freq.party$dis_won[cum_freq.party$party=="Democratic"] <-
num_dis - cum_freq.party$dis_won[cum_freq.party$party=="Democratic"]
scat.party <- ggplot(cum_freq.party , aes(x=mean , y=dis_won , color=party ,
size=seed.plot , alpha=perc),na.rm=TRUE) +
geom_point(na.rm=TRUE) +
geom_segment(aes(x=50,y=0,xend=50,yend=num_dis),color=I('black '),size =.25) +
geom_segment(aes(x=max(min(cum_freq.party$mean)-5,50),y=num_dis/2,
xend=min(max(cum_freq.party$mean )+5,100), yend=num_dis/2),
color=I('black '),size =.25) +
labs(title=NULL , subtitle=NULL , x="Statewide Vote (%)", y="Districts Won",
color="Party",size="") +
scale_color_manual(breaks=c("Republican","Democratic"),values=rev(colors )) +
scale_alpha("Relative\nFrequency (%)",range = c(0, 0.5), limits=c(0 ,100)) +
scale_size_manual("",breaks = c("Seed"), values=c(2 ,4)) +
theme # + theme(plot.title=element_blank (), plot.subtitle=element_blank ())
# Plot of step functions
cum_sim2 <- cum_sim[,c("dis_won","mean","est","seed","seed.plot")] %>%
gather(variable , value , dis_won) %>%
unite("var", est , variable , sep = "|") %>%
spread(var , value ,sep="|")
names(cum_sim2 )[4:9] <- c("dis_won2.5","dis_won25","dis_won75","dis_won97 .5",
"dis_won_mean","dis_won_seed")
step.func <- function(X,votes=cum_sim2$mean[is.na(cum_sim2$seed )== FALSE],seats) {
Y <- numeric ()
for (x in X) {
d <- abs(x-votes)
ind <- which(d == min(d))
if (length(ind) == 1 & d[ind [1]] < step/2) {
Y = c(Y,seats[ind])
} else {
Y = c(Y,NA)
}
}
return(Y)
}
xs <- seq(min(cum_sim2$mean ,na.rm=TRUE),max(cum_sim2$mean ,na.rm=TRUE),
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length.out = 10000)
ymins <- step.func(xs ,votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won25[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE])
ymaxs <- step.func(xs ,votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won75[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE])
shading <- data.frame(xs,ymins ,ymaxs ,dis_won_seed=rep (0 ,10000))
stepchart <- ggplot(cum_sim2 , aes(x=mean ,y=dis_won_seed)) +
geom_segment(aes(x=50,y=0,xend=50,yend=num_dis),color=I('black '),size =.25) +
geom_segment(aes(x=max(min(xs)-5,0),y=num_dis/2,xend=min(max(xs)+5 ,100) ,
yend=num_dis/2),color=I('black '),size =.25) +
stat_function(fun=step.func ,args=list(votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won_mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE]),
n=10000 , size=1, aes(color='Mean',linetype='Mean'),na.rm=TRUE) +
stat_function(fun=step.func ,args=list(votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won2 .5[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE]),
n=10000 , size =0.75 , aes(color='2.5 and 97.5 Percentiles ',
linetype='2.5 and 97.5 Percentiles '),na.rm=TRUE) +
stat_function(fun=step.func ,args=list(votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won97 .5[ cum_sim2$seed== FALSE]),
n=10000 , size =0.75 , aes(color='2.5 and 97.5 Percentiles ',
linetype='2.5 and 97.5 Percentiles '),na.rm=TRUE) +
geom_ribbon(data=shading , aes(x=xs , ymin=ymins , ymax=ymaxs , fill='IQR'), alpha =0.5) +
geom_point(aes(x=mean , y=dis_won_seed ,size=seed.plot),na.rm=TRUE) +
scale_size_manual(element_blank(), breaks=c("Seed"), values=c(0 ,3)) +
scale_color_manual(element_blank(), values=c("darkgoldenrod1","Black")) +
scale_linetype_manual(element_blank(), values = c("dashed","solid")) +
scale_fill_manual(element_blank(), values=c("darkgoldenrod1")) +
labs(title=NULL , subtitle=NULL , x=xlab , y=ylab ,color="Winner 's Bonus",size="") +
theme
# Stepchart by party
cum_sim2.party <- cum_sim2
repub <- which(cum_sim2.party$mean > 50)
dem <- which(cum_sim2.party$mean < 50)
repdem <- which(cum_sim2.party$mean == 50)
cum_sim2.party <- rbind(cum_sim2.party ,cum_sim2.party[repdem , ])
repdem <- which(cum_sim2.party$mean == 50)
cum_sim2.party$party <- rep(NA,nrow(cum_sim2.party))
cum_sim2.party$party[repub] <- "Republican"
cum_sim2.party$party[dem] <- "Democratic"
cum_sim2.party$party[repdem] <- c(rep("Republican",length(repdem)/2),
rep("Democratic",length(repdem)/2))
cum_sim2.party$mean[cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic"] <-
100 - cum_sim2.party$mean[cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic"]
cum_sim2.party[cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic" ,4:9] <-
num_dis - cum_sim2.party[cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic" ,4:9]
cum_sim2.party <- cum_sim2.party[order(cum_sim2.party$mean), ]
xs.party <- seq(min(cum_sim2.party$mean ,na.rm=TRUE),
max(cum_sim2.party$mean ,na.rm=TRUE),length.out = 10000)
ymins.r <- step.func(xs.party ,
votes=cum_sim2.party$mean[cum_sim2.party$seed== FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Republican"],
seats=cum_sim2.party$dis_won2 .5[cum_sim2.party$seed==FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Republican"])
ymaxs.r <- step.func(xs.party ,
votes=cum_sim2.party$mean[cum_sim2.party$seed== FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Republican"],
seats=cum_sim2.party$dis_won97 .5[ cum_sim2.party$seed==FALSE &
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cum_sim2.party$party == "Republican"])
shading.r <- data.frame(xs.party ,ymins.r,ymaxs.r,dis_won_seed=rep (0 ,10000))
ymins.d <- step.func(xs.party ,
votes=cum_sim2.party$mean[cum_sim2.party$seed== FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic"],
seats=cum_sim2.party$dis_won2 .5[cum_sim2.party$seed==FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic"])
ymaxs.d <- step.func(xs.party ,
votes=cum_sim2.party$mean[cum_sim2.party$seed== FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic"],
seats=cum_sim2.party$dis_won97 .5[ cum_sim2.party$seed==FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic"])
shading.d <- data.frame(xs.party ,ymins.d,ymaxs.d,dis_won_seed=rep (0 ,10000))
stepchart.party <- ggplot(cum_sim2.party , aes(x=mean ,y=dis_won_seed)) +
geom_segment(aes(x=50,y=0,xend=50,yend=num_dis),color=I('black '),size =.25) +
geom_segment(aes(x=max(min(xs.party)-5,50),y=num_dis/2,
xend=min(max(xs.party )+5 ,100) ,
yend=num_dis/2),color=I('black '),size =.25) +
geom_ribbon(data=shading.r, aes(x=xs.party , ymin=ymins.r, ymax=ymaxs.r,
fill='Republican '), alpha =0.25) +
geom_ribbon(data=shading.d, aes(x=xs.party , ymin=ymins.d, ymax=ymaxs.d,
fill='Democratic '), alpha =0.25) +
geom_point(aes(x=mean , y=dis_won_seed , color=party , size=seed.plot),
alpha =0.25,na.rm=TRUE) +
stat_function(fun=step.func ,args=list(
votes=cum_sim2.party$mean[cum_sim2.party$seed==FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Republican"],
seats=cum_sim2.party$dis_won_mean[cum_sim2.party$seed== FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Republican"]),
n=10000 , alpha =0.5, size =1.25, aes(color='Republican '),na.rm=TRUE) +
stat_function(fun=step.func ,args=list(
votes=cum_sim2.party$mean[cum_sim2.party$seed==FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic"],
seats=cum_sim2.party$dis_won_mean[cum_sim2.party$seed== FALSE &
cum_sim2.party$party == "Democratic"]),
n=10000 , alpha =0.5, size =1.25, aes(color='Democratic '),na.rm=TRUE) +
scale_size_manual(element_blank(), breaks=c("Seed"), values=c(0 ,4)) +
scale_color_manual("Party", values=rev(colors )) +
scale_fill_manual("Party", values=rev(colors )) +
labs(title=NULL , subtitle=NULL , x="Statewide Vote (%)",
y="Districts Won",caption=NULL) +
theme +
theme(legend.key.height=unit(1,"line")) +
theme(legend.key.width=unit(1,"line"))
# alternate step plot
bonus.as.number <- function(dis_won , mean) {
out <- numeric ()
for (i in 1: length(dis_won)) {
if (is.na(dis_won[i])== FALSE) {
if (100*dis_won[i]/num_dis - mean[i] > 0) out <- c(out , 1)
else if (100*dis_won[i]/num_dis - mean[i] < 0) out <- c(out , -1)
}
else out <- c(out , NA)
}
return (out)
}
stepchart.alt <- ggplot(cum_sim2 , aes(x=mean , y=dis_won_mean ,
color=bonus.as.number(dis_won_seed ,mean ))) +
geom_segment(aes(x=50,y=0,xend=50,yend=num_dis),color=I('black '),size =.25) +
geom_segment(aes(x=20,y=num_dis/2,xend=80,yend=num_dis/2),color=I('black '),size =.25) +
geom_line(aes(y=dis_won_mean , color=bonus.as.number(dis_won_mean ,mean)),
na.rm=TRUE ,size =1.25) +
geom_line(aes(y=dis_won2.5, color=bonus.as.number(dis_won2.5,mean)),na.rm=TRUE) +
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geom_line(aes(y=dis_won97.5, color=bonus.as.number(dis_won97.5,mean)),na.rm=TRUE) +
geom_ribbon(data=cum_sim2 , aes(ymin=pmin(dis_won25 ,mean/100*num_dis),
ymax=pmin(dis_won75 ,mean/100*num_dis)),
color=NA, fill=colors [2], alpha="0.35") +
geom_ribbon(data=cum_sim2 , aes(ymin=pmax(dis_won25 ,mean/100*num_dis),
ymax=pmax(dis_won75 ,mean/100*num_dis)),
color=NA, fill=colors [1], alpha="0.35") +
labs(title=NULL , subtitle=NULL , x=xlab , y=ylab ,color="Winner 's Bonus",size="") +
geom_point(aes(x=mean , y=dis_won_seed , size=seed)) +
scale_size_manual(breaks = c("Seed"), values=c(0,5)) +
scale_color_gradient(low=colors [2],high=colors [1]) +
theme
# Box Plots of Simulation
box <- ggplot(cum_sim , aes(y=mean , x=dis_won)) +
geom_segment(aes(y=50,x=0,yend=50,xend=num_dis),color=I('red'),size =.25) +
geom_segment(aes(y=0,x=num_dis/2,yend =100, xend=num_dis/2),color=I('red'),size =.25) +
geom_boxplot(aes(group=dis_won)) + coord_flip() +
labs(title=NULL , subtitle=NULL ,
y=xlab , x=ylab) + theme
# Histogram of Efficiency Gap at 50\% vote
cum_freq$Bonus.party[cum_freq$Bonus == 0] <-
rep("Neither",length(which(cum_freq$Bonus == 0)))
cum_freq$Bonus.party <- factor(cum_freq$Bonus.party ,
levels=c("Republican","Democratic","Neither"),ordered=TRUE)
eg.mean <- round(sum(cum_freq$eg[cum_freq$mean ==50]*
cum_freq$perc[cum_freq$mean ==50]/100) ,2)
cum_freq$eg<- round(cum_freq$eg ,2)
freq50 <- ggplot(cum_freq[cum_freq$mean == 50,],
aes(x=dis_won ,y=perc ,fill=Bonus.party)) +
geom_bar(stat='identity ') +
geom_segment(aes(x=num_dis/2,xend=num_dis/2,y=0,
yend=min(max(cum_freq[cum_freq$mean == 50,c("perc")])+10 ,100))) +
coord_flip() +
scale_x_continuous(sec.axis=sec_axis(~./num_dis*100-50,
name="Efficiency Gap",
breaks=unique(cum_freq[cum_freq$mean == 50,c("eg")]))) +
scale_fill_manual(breaks=c("Republican","Democratic","Neither"),
values=c(colors ,"#861 e3a")) +
labs(title=NULL ,
subtitle=NULL ,
x="Districts Won by Republicans",
y="Relative Frequency (%)",
fill="Electoral Advantage",
caption = NULL) +
theme +
theme(legend.position='bottom ') +
annotate("text", x=min(cum_freq$dis_won[cum_freq$mean ==50]) -0.25 ,
y=0.85*min(max(cum_freq[cum_freq$mean == 50,c("perc")])+10 ,100) ,
label= paste0("Mean EG: ",as.character(eg.mean)),
size =3)
# Bernstein Style Shift
points <- data.frame(vote=c(seed_mean),seats=c(length(which(rep_seed >= 50))),
seed=c("Seed"))
for (mean in min_mean:max_mean) {
elec <- rep_seed + (mean -seed_mean)
v <- mean(elec)
s <- length(which(elec > 50))
is.seed <- ""
point <- data.frame(vote=c(v),seats=c(s),seed=c(is.seed))
points <- rbind(points , point)
}
bern <- ggplot(points , aes(x=vote , y=seats)) +
geom_point(alpha=1,aes(size=seed)) +
geom_segment(aes(x=50,y=0,xend=50,yend=num_dis),color=I('black '),size =.125) +
geom_segment(aes(x=max(min(cum_freq$mean)-5,0),y=num_dis/2,
xend=min(max(cum_freq$mean )+5,100),
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yend=num_dis/2),color=I('black '),size =.125) +
stat_function(fun=step.func ,args=list(
votes=points$vote[points$seed==""],
seats=points$seats[points$seed==""]),
n=10000 , size=1,na.rm=TRUE) +
labs(title=NULL , subtitle=NULL ,
x="Statewide Republican Vote (%)",
y="Number of Districts Won by Republicans",size="") +
scale_size_manual(breaks = c("Seed"), values=c(3.5 ,0)) + theme
return(list(data=cum_freq , scat=scat , scat.party = scat.party ,
step=stepchart , step.party=stepchart.party , freq50=freq50 , bern=bern))
}
# ######################################################################
# Looking at simulations of states
# ---- sim_states
set.seed (34734)
pa <- sim.range(s="Pennsylvania",year.start = 2004, year.end =2010)
wi <- sim.range(s="Wisconsin",year.start = 2012, year.end =2016)
md <- sim.range(s="Maryland",year.start = 2012, year.end =2016)
nc <- sim.range(s="North Carolina",year.start = 2012, year.end =2016)
az <- sim.range(s="Arizona",year.start = 2012, year.end =2016)
oh <- sim.range(s="Ohio",year.start = 2012, year.end =2016)
save(pa ,wi,md,nc ,az,oh,file="sims.rds")
73
Evaluation Script
# #######################################################################
#
# program: evaluation .r
# author: Zachary Morgan
#
# purpose: To examine the accuracy of the simulation process
#
# inputs: analysis dataset created in analysis_data.r program
#
# outputs: plots and measures of simulation accuracy
#
# run order: 5
#
# #######################################################################
# ---- init
library(ggplot2)
source("simulation.R")
# Importing dataset for analysis
imported <- read.csv("analysis.csv")
analysis <- imported[is.na(imported$Rep_shift.adj) == FALSE &
imported$num_dis > 1, ]
# Changing applicable varibles to factor type
analysis$Year <- factor(analysis$Year)
analysis$Unopposed <- factor(analysis$Unopposed)
analysis$Unopp.adj <- factor(analysis$Unopp.adj)
analysis$map <- factor(analysis$map)
analysis$size <- factor(analysis$size)
# ######################################################################
# Theme to be used for plots
theme <- theme(plot.title=element_text(size=12,
face="bold",
#family =" American Typewriter ",
color="black",
hjust =0.5,
lineheight =1.2),
plot.subtitle=element_text(size=9,
#face =" bold",
#family =" American Typewriter ",
color="black",
hjust =0.5,
lineheight =1.2),
axis.title=element_text(size=9),
plot.caption=element_text(size=7),
legend.title = element_text(size=9, color = "black"),
legend.text=element_text(size=7),
legend.justification=c(1,0),
legend.position='right',
legend.background = element_blank(),
legend.key = element_blank(),
legend.margin=margin (-3,0,-3,0))
colors <- c("#E91D0E","#232066")
states <- c('Alabama ','Alaska ','Arizona ','Arkansas ','California ','Colorado ',
'Connecticut ','Delaware ','Florida ','Georgia ','Hawaii ','Idaho',
'Illinois ','Indiana ','Iowa','Kansas ','Kentucky ','Maine ',
'Maryland ','Massachusetts ','Michigan ','Minnesota ','Mississippi ',
'Missouri ','Montana ','Nebraska ','Nevada ','New Hampshire ',
'New Jersey ','New Mexico ','New York','North Carolina ',
'North Dakota ','Ohio','Oklahoma ','Oregon ','Pennsylvania ',
'Rhode Island ','South Carolina ','South Dakota ','Tennessee ',
'Texas ','Utah','Vermont ','Virginia ','Washington ','West Virginia ',
'Wisconsin ','Wyoming ')
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# ######################################################################
# Determining number of complete seed years
# ---- completeseed
com <- 0
incom <- 0
for (s in states) {
for (y in seq(from =2004 ,to=2016,by=2)) {
if (length(which(imported$incl[imported$State == s &
imported$Year == y]== FALSE)) == 0) {
com <- com + 1
} else {
incom <- incom + 1
}
}
}
# ######################################################################
# Cross Validation
# ---- crossval
set.seed (514568)
eval <- data.frame(State = character (), Year=numeric(),
in95 = logical(), in50 = logical ())
for (s in states) {
for (y in seq(from =2004 ,to=2016,by=2)) {
print(paste(s,y))
res <- sim(s=s,year.start=y,year.end=y,cross.validate = TRUE ,
invert.seed=TRUE ,nw.distrib = FALSE ,fill.incom = TRUE)
print(res)
if (! is.null(res)) {
data <- rep(res$dis_won[res$seed == FALSE],
res$freq[res$seed == FALSE])
pct <- mean(data < res$dis_won[res$seed])
pct.high <- mean(data <= res$dis_won[res$seed])
pct.mid <- (pct + pct.high) / 2
dis_won <- res$dis_won[res$seed==TRUE]
num_dis <- imported$num_dis[imported$State==s &
imported$Year == y][1]
prob <- res$perc[res$seed==FALSE & res$dis_won==dis_won]
if (length(prob )==0) {prob =0}
q <- quantile(data , probs=c(0.025 ,0.25 ,0.75 ,0.975))
q <- round(q)
e <- data.frame(State=s,
Year=y,
dis_won = dis_won ,
dis_won.pct = dis_won/num_dis ,
num_dis = num_dis ,
pct=pct ,
pct.mid=pct.mid ,
pct.high=pct.high ,
prob=prob ,
in95 = c(q[1] <= res$dis_won[res$seed] &
res$dis_won[res$seed] <= q[4]),
in50 = c(q[2] <= res$dis_won[res$seed] &
res$dis_won[res$seed] <= q[3]))
eval <- rbind(eval ,e)
}
}
}
(in95 <- length(eval$in95[eval$in95]) / nrow(eval))
(in50 <- length(eval$in50[eval$in50]) / nrow(eval))
# ######################################################################
# Comparison of statewide versus nationwide residual usage
# ---- swnw
sw.vs.nw <- function(s,year.start ,year.end ,n=2000 , step=1,fill.incom=TRUE) {
# s <- State
# year.start <- First year to use in seed
# year.end <- last year to use in seed
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# n <- Number of Simulated Datapoints per step
# step <- Difference between simulated shifts
# Creating sequence of years to be used
y <- seq(from=year.start ,to=year.end ,by=2)
# Taking relavent subset of data
to.use <- imported[imported$State==s & imported$Year %in% y, ]
if (is.null(nrow(to.use))) {
print("No included records for desired year")
return(NULL)
}
# Ensuring all selected years come from the same congressional map
if (length(unique(to.use$map)) > 1) {
print("Years come from different congressional maps.")
return(NULL)
}
# Detective incomplete seeds if necessary
if (fill.incom==FALSE & length(which(to.use$incl==FALSE)) > 0) {
print("Seed incomplete.")
return(NULL)
}
# Standardizing for year to year shifts by expressing each
# percentage in year.start terms
shift.from.year1 <- 0
if (length(y) > 1) {
for (i in 2: length(y)) {
shift.from.year1 <- shift.from.year1+
to.use$Rep_shift_sw[to.use$Year == y[i]][1]
to.use$Rep_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]] <-
to.use$Rep_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]] - shift.from.year1
to.use$Dem_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]] <-
100 - to.use$Rep_perc.adj[to.use$Year == y[i]]
}
}
# Deriving seed values if possible
grouped <- group_by(to.use[to.use$incl == TRUE , ], District)
rep_seed <- unlist(summarize(grouped ,
val=mean(Rep_perc.adj ,na.rm=TRUE))$val)
seed_mean <- mean(rep_seed)
num_dis = to.use$num_dis [1]
if (length(rep_seed) < num_dis) {
print("Unable to complete seed.")
return(NULL)
}
# Determing minimum and maximum shifts.
# Ensuring no more than 5% of resids dist would lead to impossible percentages
q <- quantile(analysis$Rep_shift.resid ,probs=c(.05 ,.95))
min_shift <- - q[1] - min(rep_seed)
max_shift <- 100 - q[2] - max(rep_seed)
# Creting sequence of shifts
state_shifts <- seq(ceiling(min_shift), floor(max_shift), by=step)
state_means <- state_shifts + seed_mean
steps <- length(state_shifts)
# Simulating shifts using statewide distribution
cum_freq.sw <- sim(s=s,year.start = year.start , year.end=year.end ,
means=state_means , fill.incom=fill.incom , nw.distrib = FALSE , n=n)
if (is.null(cum_freq.sw)) return(NULL)
cum_sim.sw <- cbind(cum_freq.sw[cum_freq.sw$seed == TRUE ,
c("dis_won","mean","seed")],est=c(NA))
for (m in unique(unlist(cum_freq.sw$mean ))) {
data <- rep(cum_freq.sw$dis_won[cum_freq.sw$mean == m &
cum_freq.sw$seed==FALSE],
cum_freq.sw$freq[cum_freq.sw$mean == m & cum_freq.sw$seed== FALSE])
q <- quantile(data , probs=c(0.025 ,0.25 ,0.75 ,0.975))
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sim_means <- data.frame(dis_won=c(round(mean(data))),mean=c(m),
seed=c(FALSE),est=c("mean"))
sim_025 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[1]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(2.5))
sim_25 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[2]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(25))
sim_75 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[3]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(75))
sim_975 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[4]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(97.5))
cum_sim.sw <- rbind(cum_sim.sw , sim_means)
cum_sim.sw <- rbind(cum_sim.sw , sim_025)
cum_sim.sw <- rbind(cum_sim.sw , sim_25)
cum_sim.sw <- rbind(cum_sim.sw , sim_75)
cum_sim.sw <- rbind(cum_sim.sw , sim_975)
}
cum_sim.sw$Bonus <- (100*cum_sim.sw$dis_won / num_dis) - cum_sim.sw$mean
cum_sim.sw$seed.plot <- rep("",nrow(cum_sim.sw))
cum_sim.sw$seed.plot[cum_sim.sw$seed] <- "Seed"
cum_sim.sw$Bonus.party <- rep(NA , nrow(cum_sim.sw))
adv <- which(cum_sim.sw$Bonus > 0)
cum_sim.sw$Bonus.party[adv] <- rep("Republican",length(adv))
disadv <- which(cum_sim.sw$Bonus < 0)
cum_sim.sw$Bonus.party[disadv] <- rep("Democratic",length(disadv ))
cum_sim.sw$distrib <- rep("State",nrow(cum_sim.sw))
# Simulating shifts using nationwide distribution
cum_freq.nw <- sim(s=s,year.start = year.start , year.end=year.end ,
means=state_means , fill.incom=fill.incom , nw.distrib = TRUE , n=n)
cum_sim.nw <- cbind(cum_freq.nw[cum_freq.nw$seed == TRUE ,
c("dis_won","mean","seed")],est=c(NA))
for (m in unique(unlist(cum_freq.nw$mean ))) {
data <- rep(cum_freq.nw$dis_won[cum_freq.nw$mean == m &
cum_freq.nw$seed== FALSE], cum_freq.nw$freq[cum_freq.nw$mean == m &
cum_freq.nw$seed== FALSE])
q <- quantile(data , probs=c(0.025 ,0.25 ,0.75 ,0.975))
sim_means <- data.frame(dis_won=c(round(mean(data))),mean=c(m),
seed=c(FALSE),est=c("mean"))
sim_025 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[1]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(2.5))
sim_25 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[2]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(25))
sim_75 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[3]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(75))
sim_975 <- data.frame(dis_won=round(q[4]), mean=c(m),seed=c(FALSE),est=c(97.5))
cum_sim.nw <- rbind(cum_sim.nw , sim_means)
cum_sim.nw <- rbind(cum_sim.nw , sim_025)
cum_sim.nw <- rbind(cum_sim.nw , sim_25)
cum_sim.nw <- rbind(cum_sim.nw , sim_75)
cum_sim.nw <- rbind(cum_sim.nw , sim_975)
}
cum_sim.nw$Bonus <- (100*cum_sim.nw$dis_won / num_dis) - cum_sim.nw$mean
cum_sim.nw$seed.plot <- rep("",nrow(cum_sim.nw))
cum_sim.nw$seed.plot[cum_sim.nw$seed] <- "Seed"
cum_sim.nw$Bonus.party <- rep(NA , nrow(cum_sim.nw))
adv <- which(cum_sim.nw$Bonus > 0)
cum_sim.nw$Bonus.party[adv] <- rep("Republican",length(adv))
disadv <- which(cum_sim.nw$Bonus < 0)
cum_sim.nw$Bonus.party[disadv] <- rep("Democratic",length(disadv ))
cum_sim.nw$distrib <- rep("Nation",nrow(cum_sim.nw))
cum_sim <- rbind(cum_sim.nw ,cum_sim.sw)
# Labels for plots
t <- "Statewide Vote and Seats Won"
if (length(y) == 1) {
st <- paste("Simulations of Elections in ",s," Using ",y,
" as the Seed. (n=",n,"/step)",sep="")
} else if (length(y) > 1) {
st <- paste("Simulations of Elections in ",s," Using Years ",
paste0(year.start ,"-",year.end)," as Seed. (n=",n," per step)",sep="")
}
xlab <- "Statewide Republican Vote (%)"
ylab <- "Number of Districts Won by Republicans"
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# Stepchart by distrib
cum_sim2 <- cum_sim[,c("dis_won","mean","est","distrib","seed.plot","seed")] %>%
gather(variable , value , dis_won) %>%
unite("var", est , variable , sep = "|") %>%
spread(var , value ,sep="|")
names(cum_sim2 )[5:10] <- c("dis_won2.5","dis_won25","dis_won75","dis_won97 .5",
"dis_won_mean","dis_won_seed")
step <- function(X,votes=cum_sim2$mean[is.na(cum_sim2$seed )== FALSE],seats) {
Y <- numeric ()
for (x in X) {
for (i in 1:( length(votes )-1)) {
if (x >= votes[i] & x < votes[i+1]) {
Y <- c(Y,seats[i])
break
}
else if (i== length(votes )-1) {
Y <- c(Y,NA)
}
}
}
return(Y)
}
xs <- seq(min(cum_sim2$mean ,na.rm=TRUE),
max(cum_sim2$mean ,na.rm=TRUE),length.out = 10000)
ymins.sw <- step(xs,
votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "State"],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won2 .5[cum_sim2$seed==FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "State"])
ymaxs.sw <- step(xs,
votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "State"],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won97 .5[ cum_sim2$seed==FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "State"])
shading.sw <- data.frame(xs ,ymins.sw ,ymaxs.sw,dis_won_seed=rep (0 ,10000))
ymins.nw <- step(xs,
votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "Nation"],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won2 .5[cum_sim2$seed==FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "Nation"])
ymaxs.nw <- step(xs,
votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "Nation"],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won97 .5[ cum_sim2$seed==FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "Nation"])
shading.nw <- data.frame(xs ,ymins.nw ,ymaxs.nw,dis_won_seed=rep (0 ,10000))
stepchart <- ggplot(cum_sim2 , aes(x=mean ,y=dis_won_seed)) +
geom_segment(aes(x=50,y=0,xend=50,yend=num_dis),color=I('black '),size =.25) +
geom_segment(aes(x=max(min(xs)-5,0),y=num_dis/2,xend=min(max(xs)+5 ,100) , yend=num_dis/2),
color=I('black '),size =.25) +
geom_ribbon(data=shading.sw, aes(x=xs, ymin=ymins.sw , ymax=ymaxs.sw, fill='State '),
alpha =0.25, na.rm=TRUE) +
geom_ribbon(data=shading.nw, aes(x=xs, ymin=ymins.nw , ymax=ymaxs.nw, fill='Nation '),
alpha =0.25, na.rm=TRUE) +
geom_point(aes(x=mean , y=dis_won_seed , color=distrib , size=seed.plot),
alpha =0.5, na.rm=TRUE) +
stat_function(fun=step ,args=list(
votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "State"],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won_mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "State"]),
n=10000 , alpha =0.5, size=1, aes(color='State '), na.rm=TRUE) +
stat_function(fun=step ,args=list(
votes=cum_sim2$mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "Nation"],
seats=cum_sim2$dis_won_mean[cum_sim2$seed== FALSE & cum_sim2$distrib == "Nation"]),
n=10000 , alpha =0.5, size=1, aes(color='Nation '), na.rm=TRUE) +
scale_size_manual(element_blank(), breaks=c("Seed"), values=c(0 ,3)) +
scale_color_manual("Residual Distribution", values=c("Darkgoldenrod1","Cyan")) +
scale_fill_manual("Residual Distribution", values=c("Darkgoldenrod1","Cyan")) +
labs(title=NULL , subtitle=NULL , x=xlab , y=ylab ,caption=NULL) +
theme + theme(legend.position = c(1, 0)) +
78
theme(legend.key.height=unit(1,"line")) +
theme(legend.key.width=unit(1,"line")) +
theme(legend.margin=margin (5,5,5,5))
mean.diff <- length(which(! cum_sim2$dis_won_mean[cum_sim2$distrib =="Nation"]==
cum_sim2$dis_won_mean[cum_sim2$distrib =="State"]))
mean.diff.perc <- 100 * mean.diff / length(state_means)
return(list(plot=stepchart ,diff=mean.diff ,diff.perc=mean.diff.perc))
}
sw.vs.nw.df <- function () {
num.resids <- data.frame(state=character(),n=numeric ())
for (s in states) {
n.resids <- nrow(analysis[is.na(analysis$Rep_shift.resid )== FALSE &
analysis$State == s, ])
num.resids <- rbind(num.resids , data.frame(state=c(s),n=c(n.resids )))
}
sw.vs.nw.res <- data.frame(state=character(),year=numeric(),
diff=numeric(),diff.perc=numeric ())
for (s in states) {
for (y in seq (2004 ,2016 ,by=2)) {
out <- sw.vs.nw(s=s,y,y)
if (! is.null(out)) {
o <- data.frame(state=c(s),year=c(y),diff=c(out$diff),
diff.perc=c(out$diff.perc))
sw.vs.nw.res <- rbind(sw.vs.nw.res ,o)
}
}
}
sw.vs.nw.res <- merge(sw.vs.nw.res ,num.resids ,by=c("state"))
names(spread )[1:2] <- c("state","year")
sw.vs.nw.res <- merge(sw.vs.nw.res ,spread ,by=c("state","year"))
write.csv(sw.vs.nw.res ,"sw.nw.csv")
}
# ---- swnwscat
sw.vs.nw.res <- read.csv("sw.nw.csv")
ggplot(sw.vs.nw.res , aes(x=var ,y=diff.perc)) +
geom_point() +
labs(
title=NULL ,
x="Variance",
y="Mean Disagreement (%)"
) +
theme
# ---- swnwex
out <- sw.vs.nw(s="Nebraska" ,2006 ,2006)
out$plot
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